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Education has come to the fore in development policy and as such has sparked a great deal of 
research on the relative importance of educational inputs. While school resources and family 
attributes are often the focus of such work, there are a number of papers exploring the significance 
of the impact of school management on learner test results. However, much of the quantitative 
research is inconclusive. This is largely due to the non-standardized and subjective measurements of 
management that have been used.   
 
This dissertation proposes the use of the Institutional Analysis and Design framework of Ostrom 
and colleagues (1990; 1994; 2005; 2009) as a means of benchmarking school management. The 
core components of the IAD framework are used to create a series of management indices for a 
sample of schools in the Western Cape. The paper finds, through a series of statistical approaches, 
that management is a significant input into the school production function and may be more 
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CHAPTER 1 Literature Review 
1.1 WHY IS EDUCATION IMPORTANT? 
 
‘Education is development. It creates choices and opportunities for people, reduces the twin burdens of 
poverty and diseases, and gives a stronger voice in society. For nations it creates a dynamic workforce and 
well-informed citizens able to compete and cooperate globally – opening doors to economic and social 
prosperity’ 
      (World Bank, 2004)       
 
Many economists have acknowledged that education, and the human capital that it generates, is a crucial input for 
economic growth (Barro & Lee, 2000; Lucas, 1988; Mankiw, Romer, & Weil, 1992). As workers obtain higher levels 
of education they become more skilled and productive and are able to increase the output of goods and services in an 
economy (Barro & Lee, 2000). Several economists have estimated the benefits of education to society: In the United 
States, Denison (1967; 1979) found that between 10 and 15 per cent of real income growth is directly attributable to 
education (a similarly large result for the USA was also found by Shultz (1960)). The link between education and 
economic growth is not unique to the United States and de Meulemeester and Rochat (1995) find Granger-causality 
running from higher education to economic development (measured by GDP per capita) in Japan, France, the United 
Kingdom and Sweden. Further, education has been shown to be directly related to agricultural output and Jamison 
and Lau (1982) estimate that an additional year of education for the head of an agricultural household raises output by 
approximately 2 per cent for that household. Yang (2004) also finds evidence that in China schooling enhances the 
ability of farmers to devote labour and capital to non-agricultural production (industries and services) and that the 
expansion of nonfarm activities can contribute significantly to household income growth. 
 
At the national level there are further nonmarket benefits from education and these include the stabilization of 
democracy (Barro, 1999; Glaeser, Ponzetto & Shleifer, 2006), the reduction of criminal activity (Lochner & Moretti, 
2001; Lochner, 2008; Ehrlich, 1975; Buonanno & Leonida, 2009) and increased concern for environmental 
sustainability.  Aside from country level benefits, education also directly benefits the individual who invests in it: 
Psacharopoulos (1994) estimated that the rate of return to education is approximately 10 per cent per annum and is 
higher in developing countries, especially those with skill shortages (typified by South Africa). The private benefits of 
education have been well established and include better employment prospects, higher salaries, and a greater ability to 
save and invest. These benefits may result in better health, lower fertility rates and improved quality of life (Barro, 




















With such evidence as to the advantages of investment in education there is little doubt that a country’s education 
system should be a key priority and that a well-functioning system is likely to result in a plethora of country- and 
individual-level benefits. Policies makers agree with this sentiment and in recent years education has become a major 
international focus resulting in one of the eight Millennium Development Goals (MDG) set forward by the United 
Nations being to ‘achieve universal primary school enrolment’ by 2015. However, there is still the question of 
whether increased enrolment rates or increased average years of education will lead to ‘improved’ education. School 
enrollment does not capture the effect of drop-outs or repeaters and years of schooling assumes a year of schooling 
produces the same amount of student achievement, or skills, over time. In short these measures show the quantity of 
education, however, the quality of education in developing countries is low in the sense that children do not leave 
school having learnt all that the curriculum states they should (Glewwe & Kremer, 2005; Lockheed & Verspoor, 
1991; Harbison & Hanushek, 1992). Often data is limited and quantity of education is the only measure available. 
However, recent rounds of international testing have given a means to proxy for international educational quality. 
Hence, in the following section the literature on South Africa’s quality of education in an international context is 
discussed. 
 
1.2 SOUTH AFRICAN LEARNER PERFORMANCE 
1.2.1 Learner performance in a global context 
 
Since the end of apartheid the South African government has invested large sums of money in education. The 
expenditure on education, relative to both the country’s GDP and the total budget, is high (in 2011 21 per cent of the 
national budget, close to R200 billion, was allocated to education). However, the system continues to produce largely 
poor quality outcomes as well as low private and social returns to individuals and the economy. (Taylor N. , 2008) 
Although educational access is no longer a problem in South Africa with more than 90 per cent of children from all 
race groups remaining at school until obtaining a matric or reaching the age of 16 (van der Berg, 2002), a series of 
international studies have established that weak learner performance and low educational attainment continues to be a 
feature of South African’s schooling system (Chrisholm, 2004), even when compared to other developing countries. 
Analysis of four international datasets namely: the Trends in Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), the Progress 
in International Reading Study (PIRLS), the Monitoring Learning Achievement Project (MLA) and the Southern 
Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality studies (SACMEQ II and III) have illustrated that this trend is 
presence in both primary and high schools.  
 
The MLA project was completed in 1999 and measured the competencies of Grade 4 learners in 12 African countries 



















areas and were ranked the lowest of the 12 participating countries in numeracy, the fifth lowest in literacy and the 
third lowest in life skills (Department of Education, 2009). Almost 45 per cent of learners achieved below 25 per cent 
in the numeracy test indicating numerical incompetence.  This ineptitude was re-affirmed in the TIMMS which South 
Africa participated in, in 1999 and again in 2003. This study focused on Grade 8 learning achievement in science and 
mathematics. South African learners performed poorly registering the lowest mean scores in both mathematics and 
science out of 38 countries (including Morocco and Tunisia) in 1999 and out of 50 countries (including Botswana, 
Ghana, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt) in 2003 (Taylor & Yu, 2009).  The South African average scores were in the 
range of about half the international average score with less than 10 per cent of students reaching the low international 
benchmark (LIB) of 400 points out of a possible 800 and less than 1.5 per cent reaching the high international 
benchmark (HIB) of 500 points (Department of Education, 2009).  
 
PIRLS (2006) was an international study (which included 40 countries) which measured reading literacy among 
Grade 4 learners. Again South African results were very poor and the country ranked the lowest out of 40 countries in 
terms of reading ability (Howie, et al., 2008). Additionally, only 13 per cent of Grade 4 learners and 22 per cent of 
Grade 5 learners reached the LIB level for Grade 4. This is in sharp contrast to the international data where the 
median for learners who reached the LIB was 94 per cent. Additionally almost all those who tested in African 
languages failed to reach the LIB – illustratively, 1 per cent of isiNdebele, Siswati and isiXhosa learners reached the 
LIB in Grade 4 and not one African language learner was able to reach the HIB (Department of Education, 2009). 
Furthermore, in the lowest quintile the average reading score was found to be 108. Considering that much of the test 
was in multiple-choice format and that the LIB is 400, it becomes clear that many primary school learners in South 
Africa are effectively illiterate (Taylor & Yu, 2009).   
 
South Africa was the only African country besides Morocco to be included in the PIRLS, however, even when 
compared with other sub-Saharan countries South African test scores are ranked very low. South Africa has 
participated in two SACMEQ studies, SACMEQ II (2001) and SACMEQ III (2007) which focused on Grade 6 
learners in 14 sub-Saharan countries. South Africa lies in the bottom half of these countries in terms of both 
mathematics and reading scores despite much higher expenditure on education (van der Berg, 2008). Furthermore, 
South Africa ranks lower than Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda who have GDPs ranging from one fifth to 
one tenth of South Africa’s (Taylor N., 2008). When controlling for socio-economic differences South Africa’s 
literacy and numeracy scores fall close to the bottom and are well below the regional average (Ross and Zuze, 2004; 
Moloi and Chetty, 2010). 
 
The analysis of these four international datasets illustrates that the South African education system has been unable to 




















The consistantly low scores revealed by studies have certainly increased the level of debate about education in the 
media and academia and it has become clear that there is a need to be concerned about learner perfomance in the 
country (Reddy, 2005). In addition, South African learners’ scores in all the data sets were often much more varied 
than any other participating country’s with scores “ranging from a preponderance of very low scores to a few very 
high scores” (Reddy, Kanjee, Diedericks, & Winnaar, 2006, p. 112). Research indicates that the variation is due to the 
large discrepencies between results in the top quintile and the preceeding quintiles which suggest that high socio-
economic status (SES) (which in turn is closely related to race) may be a key determinant of high learner educational 
attainment (van der Berg, 2008; 2002).  
 
1.2.2 Learner performance in terms of SES and former department    
K 
The deeply entrenched legacy of apartheid has resulted in an enduring correlation between wealth (which is still 
largely distributed according to race) and academic performace leading to a high intraclass correlation coeffcient (rho) 
which reflects a far greater level of between-school variance then most countries (van der Berg, 2008). Hence school 
results follow a constant, statistically bimodal distribution which tells the ‘tale of two schools’ (Spaull, 2011) with the 
vast majority of learner results grouped at the low end of the scale while a small group achieves at the higher end 
(Fleisch, 2008). This bimodal pattern has been uncovered in both international and national assessments in primary 
and high schools. The figures below illustrate how both numeracy and reading scores from the SACMEQ III study are 
influenced by school  SES level. Figure 1 below illustrates how reading scores are largely bimodal and strongly 
associated with school wealth. Hence the bottom quintiles yield reading scores which are distinctly lower than the 
schools in the fifth quintile. The pattern is mimicked for numeracy scores, shown in Figure 2, with the lower four 
quintiles all peaking at a much lower point than the richest quintile. Comparitively, the fifth quintile of South African 
schools was only outperformed by Mauritius and Kenya whereas the South African mean scores in quintiles one 
through four fell below the SACMEQ all-country mean  (Taylor N., 2008). 
 
What is of further interest is that the bottom quintiles all perform at a similar level.  Van der Berg (2002) argues that 
there is an SES ‘threshold level’ below which reading and mathematics scores do not improve much with incremental 
increases in SES. This threshold could be as high as the 4
th
 quintile as the only real observable difference in results is 
in the top quintile whose SACMEQ results are a full quarter higher than the rest of the country. It appears that South 
African schools are unable to turn higher SES into an educational advantage and that in many cases even middle class 




















Figure 1: Kernel density of student reading scores by quintile 
Source: SACMEQ III South Africa 
 
 
Figure 2: Kernel density of student math scores by quintile 
Source: SACMEQ III South Africa 
 
The bimodal pattern is also evident when comparing schools across former departments and this reflects the fact that 




















schools. Therefore, formerly black (Department of Education and Training (DET)) and coloured (former House of 
Representatives (HOR)) schools obtain much lower scores than previously white and Indian schools. Table 1 below 
shows the 2003 and 2005 Grade 6 literacy pass rates in the Western Cape by former department and illustrates 
succinctly how results are heavily influenced by schools’ former-department.  
 
Table 1: Western Cape literacy pass-rates by former department 
Ex-Department Grade 6 % Distribution of Learners by 
Ex-Department 
 
2003 2005 2003 2005 
CED 82,9 86,9 20,1 21,2 
DET 3,7 4,7 13,6 14,3 
HOR 26,6 35,5 65,8 64,2 
Total Province 35 42,1 100 100 
Source: Taylor, 2008 
 
More than four out of every 5 children in former white schools are achieving at the appropriate level whereas only a 
third of all children in former coloured schools achieve at this level. More disturbingly, at former-DET schools less 
than 5 children out of each hundred were reading at the required level (Taylor N. , 2008). This indicates how Mbeki’s 
‘parallel economies’ (1998) have found real purchase in the South African education system.   
 
1.3 FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT 
 
The school system in South Africa has thus far been unable to overcome the persistence of poor educational results in 
historically disadvantaged schools. This has resulted in low human capital attainment for the vast majority of the 
country, prohibiting upward mobility and perpetuating inequality in the labour market (van der Berg, 2002). There is 
a plethora of international and South African literature that attempts to pinpoint which factors are most responsible for 
better results in some schools as opposed to others. Factors which are recurrent in the literature are: resources, teacher 
quality, school management and family effects. 
The existing literature on each of these factors as contributors to results as well as how they stand in South African 




















1.3.1.1 RESOURCES IN SOUTH AFRICAN SCHOOLS 
 
In the post-apartheid years, South Africa allocates a large (and increased) percentage of its budget towards education 
spending. There have also been substantial resource shifts to formerly disadvantaged schools: during the height of 
apartheid the government spent approximately 19c on black pupils for every R1 spent on white pupils, yet just 3 years 
after the demise of the apartheid regime black pupils received R1.41 for everyone R1 spend on white pupils (Bhorat 
& Oosthuizen, 2008). Figure 3 below shows the upward trend of expenditure on education from 2001. It also shows 
that education expenditure accounts for a large proportion of the national budget and over the last five years it has 
become increasing significant. However, despite massive resource shifts to formerly disadvantaged schools, the 
number of successful matriculants and university exemptions has actually declined even as the size of the school 
going population has increased (van der Berg, 2002).  Addtionally, there are several former-DET primary and high 
schools which achieve good results despite their limited resources while some well-resourced schools perform poorly 
which indicates that there is no deterministic pattern between performance and financial resources in South Africa 
(Taylor N., 2008). 
 
Figure 3: Education expenditure in South Africa 2001-2011 
 



























































This insignificant relationship between government spending and school results is not uncommon in the literature and 
most studies uncover inconclusive evidence of a positive effect of government spending on educational attainment 
(Landau, 1986; Noss, 1991; Flug, Spilimbergo and Wachtenheim, 1998; Bruns, Filmer, & Patrinos, 2011) although 
Anyanwu et al. (2007) estimate that a increase of 10 per cent in government expenditure on education would increase 
primary school enrollment levels by 21 – 28 per cent in Africa. Even so, there is little research on how student results 
in Africa are affected by public spending. Gupta et al. (2002) argue that the frequently insignificant effect of 
government spending on educational attainment may be due to a crowding out effect or to the inefficient and 
inequitable use of public resources. The latter view is shared by van der Berg (2002) who argues that the South 
African schooling system is subject to X-inefficiency rather than allocative inefficiency. Because of this, further 
reallocation of resources between levels of education is likely to bring little educational gain. An example of this X-
inefficiency is demonstrated by the high growth of teacher salaries coupled with only a small decrease in the pupil-
teacher ratio. Whilst financial flows to poor schools have increased hugely over the last 2 decades, the major result 
has been increased teacher salaries due to the strong bargaining power of teacher unions. Thus while spending on 
educational personnel has increased, it has not been coupled with an increase in personnel numbers and has crowded 
out spending on non-personnel based resources (Wildeman, 2008).  In this way the large increases in expenditure 
have been used in a fashion that is arguably inefficient.  
 
In the next section, current research on the types of resources that have been found to be significant in the attainment 
of academic results in South Africa and elsewhere will be discussed. 
 
1.3.1.2 THE ROLE OF RESOURCES IN EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT  
 
In the past, two strands of research – education production function (EPF) and randomized control trial (RCT) 
research - have focused extensively on the role of resources in educational attainment. Resource measures that tend to 
be assessed are the teacher-pupil ratio, teacher quality (this will be dealt with in the section 1.3.2) and measures of 
other resources in a school (including facilities and administrative inputs) (Hanushek, 1997). 
 
Hanushek’s (1995) review of 96 EPF studies in developing countries concludes that the relationship between school 
resources and test scores is tenuous at best. The most common variable used to determine this effect is a teacher-pupil 
ratio. Of 30 studies which test the effect of teacher-pupil ratio on education he finds only 8 cases where the coefficient 
is both statistically significant and positively signed. The lack of evidence for smaller classes is also found in his 
analysis of developed countries where he finds that less than 15 per cent of past studies have resulted in a statistically 



















(Wöβmann, 2003), class size was found to be statistically positively related to mathematics scores– that is students in 
bigger classes achieve better results - in 12 school systems and was not found to be statistically negatively related to 
mathematics scores in any country. Much South African data reinforces the finding that decreasing the pupil-teacher 
ratio does not seem to have any significant effect on test scores (van der Berg, 2002; Crouch and Mabogoane, 2001; 
Bhorat and Oosthuizen, 2008).  
 
Some argue that this inconclusive evidence is due to econometric issues when using the EPF method, specifically 
ommitted variable bias (for example, the presence of more resources in a school could actually be a result of a more 
involved parent body – this would lead to an upward bias) (Kremer & Duflo, 2003). RCT studies, if correctly 
specified, can overcome the issue of ommited variable bias through random selection. Treatment schools are 
randomly selected from a pool of schools with identical attributes so that the treatment and control groups only differ 
in terms of the actual treatment. There are a growing number of RCT studies focused on the effect of increasing the 
number of teachers at a school. An example is an RCT run in India where a second teacher was randomly assigned to 
21 out of 42 non-formal education centers. While the presence of a second teacher did result in the school being 
closed less often it had no measureable effect on test scores (Banerjee, Jacob, & Kremer, 2002). Therefore, both the 
RCT and EPF approach seem to indicate that a smaller pupil-teacher ratio is not necessarily likely to result in 
improved test scores. 
 
However, despite this evidence, Case and Deaton (1999) find a counter suggestion in their analysis of apartheid era 
South African schools. They use data collected in 1993 and argue that the tight migration controls in place as well as 
the highly centralized funding of black schools coupled with the wide variation of pupil-teacher ratios across black 
schools at the time creates a ‘natural experiment’. The main finding is that a decrease in the pupil-teacher ratio form 
40 to 20 pupils per teacher increases years of completed schooling from 1.5 to 2.5 years and also increases enrollment 
rates for black pupils only. Additionally they found that this decrease increases reading scores by an equivalent of two 
additional years of schooling, although it had no significant effect of learner mathematics scores. Case and Deaton are 
not alone in their finding of a positive relationship between smaller class sizes and higher test scores and several other 
studies, particularly RCTs and natural experiments have found similar results. The largest of these is the Tennessee 
STAR project which included 11600 kindergarten learners and started in 1985. Learners were randomly assigned to 
small (13 – 17 leaners) or regular (22 – 25 learners) classes where after their results were assessed once a year over 
the next four years. Krueger (1999) finds that learners in smaller classes had test results which were, on average, 4 
percentile points higher than those in larger classes after the first year and that results for learners in smaller classes 
increased by about 1 percentile point per year relative to those in regular classes. This result is re-affirmed by Angrist 
and Lavy’s (1999) paper which uses the natural experiment formed by schools’ subscription to Maimonides’ Rule in 
Israel. This rule states that a class cannot be larger than 40 and so when a class grows past this size it is divided into 




















two classes, one of 20 students and another of 21). Angrist and Lavy use regression discontinuity (RD) design and 
find a clear association between smaller class sizes and test score, particularly in mathematics. However, a more 
recent paper by Urquiola and Verhoogen (2009) which employs a similar RD design in Chilean private schools where 
a form of Maimonides’ Rule is used, finds that parents value smaller classes. This means that those learners found in 
smaller classes tend to come from richer, and more educated families which explains at least some of the differences 
in test scores. 
 
The empirical literature on class size and test scores does not reach a strong conclusion. Both EFPs and RCTs offer 
mixed evidence on the effect of smaller classes. Therefore, the only conclusion that can be drawn from the literature 
is that there is no clear, systematic relationship between pupil-teacher ratio and student outcomes (Hanushek, 2007). 
 
Other resources, besides the quantity of teachers in a school that are often cited in the literature can be divided into 
learning and non-learning resources. Non-learning resources include the school buildings and facilities (such as 
electricity and water) as well as administration resources. Learning resources include libraries, textbooks and other 
inputs used in relation to teaching and learning. In developed countries these types of resources seem to have very 
little effect on test scores with administrative resources and facilities shown to be statistically significant and 
positively signed only 12 and 9 per cent of the time respectively in American EPF studies (Hanushek, 1997). 
However, schools with a significant shortage of resources often perform worse than those with adequate resources 
and these differences can be quite large. For example, in England, students without a shortage of learning materials 
perform 30.5 test-score points higher than those wi h significant shortages (Wöβmann, 2003).  
 
In developing countries, studies have shown facilities to be statistically significant and positive in a large amount of 
cases (22 cases out of 34) (Hanushek, 1995). An analysis of SACMEQ III in South Africa (Spaull, 2011) which used 
a ‘school equipment’ index and a ‘school building’ index found neither of these to be significant for numeracy or 
literacy scores. However, other studies have uncovered the importance of non-indexed resources suggesting that not 
all resources are equal. In South Africa, Bhorat and Oosthuizen’s (2008) study of the determinants of Grade 12 pass 
rates finds several non-learning infrastructure variables to be significantly related to school performance. Some of 
these, such as computers for administration purposes and access to telephones, may show that administrative 
efficiency is a key factor in shaping the success of a school a point that has been frequently argued in the South 
African literature. Bhorat et al. (2008) also find some learning infrastructure variables significant and robust, 
especially the presence of a school library and computers for instruction. The mean pass rate for schools without a 
library was 47 per cent compared to 66 per cent for those with a library. Crouch and Mabogoane (2001) also find 
these two variables to be of some importance in their analysis of the 1997 matric results in South Africa and Case and 



















of these two variables is largely consistent in the developing country literature: A study in Ghana found that the 
presence of a school library raised the average school reading score by 0.3 standard deviations and the mathematics 
score by 1.2 standard deviations (Glewwe & Jacoby, 1992) while an RCT in India showed that a computer-assisted 
learning program improved mathematics scores by 0.35 standard deviations in the first year and 0.47 standard 
deviations in the second year (Banerjee, Cole, Duflo, & Linden, 2005). However, it is important to note that it was the 
specific utilization of the computers and not just their presence that caused the increase in test scores. It is also likely 
that the technology was substituting for weak teachers as a similarly large improvement was found by Jamison et al. 
(1981) in Nicaragua where radio-instruction was employed instead of traditional teaching (teachers quality is 
considered in section 1.3.2).   
 
Another oft cited important resource is textbooks. Econometric analysis frequently suggests that the provision of 
textbooks in schools with low initial stocks boosts educational attainment dramatically (Gustafsson, 2007; van der 
Berg, 2008; van der Berg & Louw, 2006). In South Africa where less than 45 per cent of learners have a mathematics 
textbook or their own reading book this result is of particular interest. RCTs, on the other hand, have shown that the 
effect of textbook provision may be smaller than these studies suggest. An RCT in Kenya showed that provision of 
textbooks did not affect scores for the bottom 60 per cent of students but did increase test scores by 0.2 standard 
deviations for students who had fallen in the top percentile in the pretest (Glewwe & Jacoby, 1992). This is most 
likely because lower scoring students could not understand the textbooks due to language difficulties and because 
high levels of teacher absenteeism meant they had to use the textbooks alone much of the time – a pattern that is 
likely to be repeated in South Africa.  
 
Therefore, a review of the literature shows that on the whole there are conflicting views on the importance of 
resources in educational attainment. The most common measure for resources, the teacher-pupil ratio, is not 
significant in the majority of cases in both developed and developing country studies. However, other resource 
measures are often statistically significant in developing countries. These include resources that aid in teaching and 
learning (such as textbooks, libraries and computers) and those that aid in the administration of the school (such as 
computers for the admin staff and telephone connectivity). In the next section the literature on the quality of teachers 
























1.3.2 Teacher Quality 
1.3.2.1 TEACHERS KNOWLEDGE IN SOUTH AFRICAN SCHOOLS 
 
Because poor children are less likely to get educational support from their parents or broader community, they depend 
heavily on their teachers’ knowledge and practices in the classroom. Although an important component of the 
SACMEQ project was to test teacher knowledge – a key determinant of teacher quality - South African teachers 
refused to participate in this part of the study in SACMEQ II. They were the only teachers of the 14 participating 
countries to respond in this manner, which is perhaps in itself illuminating (Taylor N., 2008). However, there are 
several studies which have managed to get information on teacher knowledge in South Africa – one is the Khanyisa 
Programme which administered a literacy and numeracy test to Grade 3 teachers in schools in the Limpopo province. 
The tests consisted of questions designed to assess Grade 6 learners yet the 25 teachers tested achieved an average of 
67 per cent for numeracy and 55 per cent for literacy. Three teachers scored below 50 per cent in the numeracy test 
and 12 in the literacy test and only one teacher obtained 100 per cent for the numeracy test whilst no teacher obtained 
over 80 per cent in the literacy test (Taylor N., 2008).  
 
Another study that amplifies the low knowledge of primary school teachers is the Integrated Education Programme 
(IEP). This project started in 2002 and was run in primary schools in four provinces in South Africa. Teachers were 
tested in mathematics, science and literacy in 2002 and again in 2006 after 4 years of intensive training (5 days of 
training a year). Worryingly, even after the training, no teacher who was tested in any level was able to achieve 100 
per cent and the minimum scores for mathematics and science were well below 50 per cent. Additionally, the average 
for mathematics for the teachers who taught grades 1 to 3 was 39.7 per cent and for those who taught grades 4 to 6 it 
was only 32.5 per cent (Taylor N., 2008; Mabogoane and Pereira 2008). Poor teacher knowledge is not just limited to 
primary schools teachers. Stols et al. (2007) ran a study in 2002 where 27 Grade 10 to 12 teachers were given a matric 
mathematics paper before engaging in a year long distance education course after which they were tested again. It is 
important to note that these teachers were self-selected and therefore most likely highly motivated and probably more 
knowledgeable than the average teacher. However, while the education course did aid in improving marks by 13 per 
cent on average, the post-test average was still below 50 per cent even for these self-selected teachers  (Taylor N., 
2008).  
 
These three studies, although testing only a small subset of South African teachers, show that on average teachers do 
not understand the material that they are expected to teach at both the primary and secondary levels. This is only 
logical if it is concluded that, on average, teachers undertake very little self-study from the textbooks at their disposal 



















show that improving teacher knowledge is a slow process even when undertaken in the intensive form that the IEP 
employed (Taylor N., 2008).  
 
1.3.2.2 THE ROLE OF TEACHER QUALITY IN EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT  
 
Teacher quality is often unobservable, yet in past studies have used proxy variables such as teacher salaries (on the 
assumption that better teachers are paid more), teacher qualifications and years of teaching experience, although it is 
important to note that teacher quality cannot be fully linked to any of these variables (Hanushek, 2002). In developed 
countries teacher education explains very little of test results – Hanushek’s (1997) review of existing studies in the 
USA finds that this variable is only significant and positive 9 per cent of the time and in Europe teacher education 
was only found to be strongly significant in Switzerland where the effect of a teacher having a university degree (as 
opposed to just secondary schooling) on test results was 42.6 points (although having a postgraduate degree was not 
found to be significant) (Wöβmann, 2003). Teacher experience is also frequently insignificant in developed country 
research but is generally of more importance than teacher education: Hanushek (1997) finds that it has the correct sign 
and is statistically significant in only 29 per cent of cases however, Wöβmann (2003) finds that the logarithim of 
experience is significant in 9 European countries and that in the Netherlands the coefficient is as high as 10. In both 
the US and the European studies, the benefits of experience tend to peak at around 20 years.  
 
In developing countries proxies for teacher quality tend to be more explanatory with experience and education being 
correctly signed and significant 35 per cent and 56 per cent of the time respectively (Hanushek, 1995). In South 
African research, teacher quality seems to be largely important – Bhorat and Oosthuizen (2008) find that housing 
provided by the school to teachers is positively related to the pass rate of matric students. They suspect that this 
variable may proxy for teacher quality as the subsidizing of living costs is likely to attract better quality teachers. 
Spaull’s (2011) prelimary analysis of the SACMEQ III results includes a variable for teacher test score as teachers 
wrote the same tests as the learners. He finds teacher subject knowledge to be statistically significant, but the 
coefficient is very small suggesting that the impact is modest. It is important to note however, that close to 20 per cent 
of teachers refused to take the test which could result in sample selection bias and, additionally, similar studies have 
uncovered quite large effects of teacher knowledge on test scores (eg. Tan, Lane, & Coustere, 1997). Crouch and 
Mabogoane (2001), who use REQV (Relative Education Qualification Value) as their proxy, find teacher quality to be 
the most important resource that a school can have with an increase in teacher education of one year being associated 
with an extraordinary 16 point increase in pass rates. The importance of teacher qualification is also found by van der 
Berg and Burger (2003) but only in achievement in mathematics. The latter also investigate the effect of teacher 





















The evidence therefore indicates that it is highly likely that teacher quality is a crucial element in educational 
attainment, however it is very difficult to measure. In South Africa in particular most proxies for teacher quality are 
usually significant and positively related to test scores and it would seem that the quality, rather than the quantity, of 
teachers is important.  
 
1.3.3 Family characteristics  
 
Family background is widely recognized as the single most important contributor to success in school. Early work by 
Coleman et al. (1966) suggested that family background alone could explain much of the variation in educational 
outcomes for socially disadvantaged students and that schools ‘don’t matter’:  
 
Schools bring little influence to bear on a child’s achievement that is independent of his [or her] 
background and general social context….the inequalities imposed on children by their home, 
neighbourhood and peer environment are carried along to become the inequalities with which they 
confront adult life at the end of school  (Coleman et al., 1966, p 325) 
 
Although subsequent research has shown that much of the family influence is mediated through schools almost all 
studies still show that family background exerts a strong, independent effect (Rumberger, 1995). The mechanism 
through which this effect is transmitted is parental involvement in education which has been shown to lead to higher 
math scores (Sheldon & Epstein, 2010), improved reading ability (Powell-Smith, Stoner, Shinn, & Good, 2000), 
lower drop-out rates (Rumberger, 1995) and higher levels of educational motivation (Fan & Williams, 2010). Parental 
involvement is transmitted through a variety of levers; most obviously the parents’ ability and interest in education 
and these are discussed below. The legacy of apartheid has impaired these levers in South Africa as parents are often 
illiterate and are unable to provide the foundations for effective literacy and mathematics, the language development 
or the cultural disposition for enquiry and active learning (Fleisch, 2008).  
 
Parental ability is most easily measured by education level: In the USA and Europe the education level of parents has 
been found to be significant in all studies. The difference in mathematics performance in learners whose parents had a 
tertiary degree compared to those learners whose parents had not finished secondary school stands in the region of 40 
– 50 test score points in the US and in most European countries (Wöβmann, 2003). The positive effect of parent 
education on learner test scores could be due to direct effects, such as a parent being more able to aid the learner with 
homework and reading, and indirect effects such as the ability of parents to give their children better language skills. 
Additionally it could also capture an inherited ‘ability’ or ‘motivational’ effect in the learner (Lam, 1999). In the 



















finds that at least one parent having a tertiary degree is highly significant in determining scores in numeracy and 
literacy. Other means of measuring parent education such as number of years of education for adults in the immediate 
area of the school (Bhorat & Oosthuizen, 2008), whether the mother has a matric (van der Berg, 2008) and the 
education level of the ‘head of the family’ (Case & Deaton, 1999) have also been shown to be statistically significant.  
 
Further measures for parent ability include the number of books in a student’s home as this can be viewed as a proxy 
for the educational, social and economic background of a learner’s family. In Europe students with two bookcases full 
of books achieve much higher results than those with only half a bookcase of books. In England this effect is as large 
as 104 math test score points, which is slightly higher than the effect in the USA (Wöβmann, 2003). In South Africa, 
which is a very ‘book poor’ country, having more than 10 books at home has a significant and positive effect on 
reading, math and health test scores (Spaull, 2011; van der Berg,  2008).  
 
There is no doubt that parents are able to positively influence their children’s test results and as such children who do 
not live with both their parents achieve statistically lower test scores. This holds true for the United States and several 
European countries where the effect is as high as 19 test-score points (in Norway) (Wöβmann, 2003). In Uganda, 
Mozambique, Kenya and Zambia case-studies have shown that children who have been orphaned, especially those in 
poorer households, are less likely to attend school and, when they do attend, they are at a distinct disadvantage in both 
primary- and high-school (Arndt, Nhate, & Barslund, 2005; Case, Paxson, & Ableidinger, 2004; Nampanya-Serpell, 
2000; Deininger, Garcia, & Subbarao, 2003).  In South Africa this is a particularly crucial point as the national 
HIV/Aids epidemic has left many children without one or both parents. Van der Berg (2008) finds evidence that 
learners who live with their parents are statistically likely to do better while Spaull (2011) finds evidence that being 
an orphan has a statistically negative effect on learner reading scores. Interestingly, he also finds that the effect of 
living in a children’s home (orphanage) is statistically significant and extremely large for all tested subject areas.  
 
Aside from parent-related variables there are several student characteristics that are significant, these include age 
(which is negatively related to test scores as it captures the effect of repeaters) as well as language. Language in South 
Africa is a pertinent issue for black learners as they are taught in their home language until the end of Grade 3 after 
which they are taught and tested in English. Therefore it is not surprising that recent studies have shown Grade 6 
leaners (tested by SACMEQ) who speak English ‘sometimes’ or ‘always’ have statistically higher results than those 
who do not speak English at home (van der Berg, 2008, 2002; Spaull, 2011).  
 
Student health has come to be seen as an important input into education in recent years and RCTs in particular have 




















2004). These studies find that the latter both improve attendance and that school feeding programs increase test scores 
slightly. School feeding programs exist in many poor South African schools (the Penninsula School Feeding 
Programme alone feeds 748 schools in just the Western Cape) and learners that have fewer than 3 meals a day have 
statistically significant lower scores in reading (Spaull, 2011). 
 
Therefore there are a number of ‘family-background’ variables which play out through parent involvement in learning 
and general learner characteristics. The context that these provide was deemed by Coleman’s work to be the most 
powerful predictor of student achievement and more recent studies also indicate that family background is statistically 
significant in both developing country and developed country settings.  This result is largely consistent across the 
majority of RCTs and EPF research and the importance of this subset of variables has been  captured in the South 
African literature.  
 
 
1.3.4 School Management  
1.3.4.1 THE STATE OF SCHOOL MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Previous sections have shown that resources and teacher quality are important determinants of school results but will 
only be effective if they are put to use in an efficient manner. Van der Berg (2008) argues that the high variability in 
test results in poor schools even after controlling for SES and teacher inputs points towards varying efficiency which 
hints at managerial problems. Over the last decade there has been much debate over the role of school leaders in 
improving performance and there are two major schools of thought on the topic. The first sees the principal as a 
charismatic leader who exercises authority in a hierarchical manner and the second calls for distributed leadership 
where leadership functions are shared by school managers and teachers as well as parents and sometimes students 
thus increasing commitment towards a common goal (Taylor N, 2008; Louis, Dretzke, & Wahlstrom, 2010).  
 
South Africa has experienced ‘seismic shifts’ (Hoadley, Christie, Jacklin, & Ward, 2009) in the management 
landscape and there has been a move toward the decentralization of leadership which has played out formerly in the 
Department of Education’s requirement that schools have a School Governing Board (with majority parent members) 
and increased focus on the role of the Senior Management Team (SMT) (van der Mescht & Tyala, 2008). 
Decentralization of leadership has been a key feature of institutional reform throughout the world and the main 
argument that underpins it is that people who are influenced by the ‘rules of the game’ (North, 1990) are empowered 
to participate in the decision-making process thus alleviating informational asymmetry (King & Ozler, 2005). King 



















actually have any effect on test scores, but de facto decentralization is associated with significant and large increases 
in math scores. It is therefore important to note that even though all schools in South Africa are required to exercise 
decentralized or shared management, this does not necessarily mean that schools practice a decentralized form of 
management. There are several reasons why this may happen in the South African context as discussed below. 
 
1.3.4.1.1 HINDRANCES TO DECENTRALIZATION 
 
In South Africa there are several issues with school management. An extremely worrying feature in poorer schools 
according to Taylor (2008) and others (Thurlow, 2003; Grant, 2006; Christie, 1998) is the general failure of staff to 
take responsibility or exercise control over their school and the fact that the majority of schools are characterized by a 
culture of opposition, dependency and non-participation as a legacy of apartheid (Thurlow, 2003). There is a sense of 
apathy among school leaders and this is taken advantage of by other actors in the school. The most obvious example 
of this is the high levels of teacher absenteeism which go unpunished by management who tend to blame transport 
systems or illness rather than the inherited dependency culture (Taylor N., 2008). This is in line with Elmore’s (2004) 
research which notes that a culture of passivity and failure is present in schools where managers and teachers assign 
causality for success or failure to forces beyond their control. This pattern is also found in other African schooling 
systems, and Glewwe et al. (2004) are able to give anecdotal evidence from Kenya where they found that teachers 
were absent 20 per cent of the time, largely blaming the transport system. However, workers in a non-profit 
organisation in the same area (who relied on the same transport system) were only absent 6,3 per cent of the time.  As 
it stands 97-100 per cent of schools in the lower 4 quintiles in South Africa reported absenteeism and late coming of 
teachers as a problem which is much higher than the SACMEQ mean. The National School Effectiveness Study 
(NSES
1
) found that between 10 and 20 per cent of teachers in the 266 schools surveyed were absent on the day of the 
survey (Taylor S., 2011) and SACMEQ III uncovered self-reported teacher absenteeism of approximately 20 days a 
year (Spaull, 2012). Although neither of these measures is entirely accurate, they do manage to demonstrate that 




 in 2003 revealed that more than a quarter of schools start late and that in close to half of the 
schools teachers and learners do not return promptly after breaks (Taylor N. , 2008). Further, even when teachers are 
present it does not mean they are adding value to learning by students and Chrisholm et al. (2005) who observed 10 
schools over a range of former departments found that even when teachers are present they only spend approximately 
41 per cent of their time (or 3.4 hours a day) teaching. Howie et al. (2008) uncovered that the way the timetable is 
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 The NSES surveyed schools between 2007 and 2009 
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structured in many South African schools does not maximize teaching time. For example over 70 per cent of South 
African schools spend less than 3 hours a week reading whereas internationally only 44 per cent of schools spend so 
little time on reading. The high levels of teacher absence have been shown to influence test scores negatively: van der 
Berg and Louw (2006) find that the negative effect of teacher absenteeism on mathematics test scores in South Africa 
is large and highly significant whereas Christie et al. (2007) who study a small subset of poor but effective South 
African schools find that, without exception, time is a highly valued commodity in these schools and teacher 
absenteeism is not reported to be a problem in any of these schools. Additionally, in an RCT in India where teachers 
had to take a photograph of themselves and their class every day for a financial reward, the resulting decrease in 
teacher absenteeism increased test scores by 0.17 standard deviations (Duflo & Hanna, 2005). 
 
Secondly, even when management has the motivation to embark on a system of distributed leadership there may be 
problems with implementation. One such problem lies on the SGBs of poor schools where low levels of parent 
literacy and role confusion can lead to poor functionality: 
 
“For many schools in South Africa, especially the previously black schools, the involvement of parents 
at governance level is new. The limited training of the main role-players in the management and 
governance of schools, coupled with their uncertainty regarding their functions and duties, makes it 
sometimes difficult for principals and parental SGB members to work together harmoniously,” 
(Heystek, 2004, pp. 308-309) 
 
Educator members of the SGB and the principal often take advantage of the low levels of parent literacy and ‘make 
policies to suit teachers’ rather than policies that benefit the school as a whole (Xaba, 2011). In other cases there is 
open conflict between SGB parent members and educator members (Joubert, 2006) Additionally it has been found 
that SGB members often overstep their roles, especially with regards to financial matters, and force deviations from 
the budget (Xaba, 2011). 
 
The relationship between the principal and other management groups are often fraught with complications as 
principals are unwilling to share their power with the SMT leading to a ‘political’ power struggle within the school 
(van der Mescht & Tyala, 2008). Further, Mkentane (2003) argues that principals often do not follow the rules on the 
SGB as they wish to maintain central control. Jansen (2000) argues that there has been an ‘overload’ of policy reform 
with regards to school management which has resulted in a loss of clarity as to the schools objectives and 
management’s role. Clearly there are major obstacles to effective management systems in South African schools, 



















with impunity the formal and informal rules of the game associated with the collaborative effort. This plays out 
through in a variety of ways namely: shirking or free riding as seen with high levels of absenteeism; distribution 
conflict as seen through the frequent unwillingness of principals to share power and corruption as seen through the 
use of the school budget for ulterior purposes. However, there is another more disturbing form that this can take and 
that is ‘predation’ which means that actions are undertaken that use channels of political support external to the 
specific arena of cooperation to override the rules (an example would be the inability to sanction teacher absenteeism 
due to high levels of teacher union interference) (Levy, 2011).  
 
There is evidence that governance of South African schools is problematic, however, although it is universally 
regarded as a key element of good schooling, qualitative studies give mixed results as to the impact of leadership on 
test scores and this is discussed below. 
 
1.3.4.2 THE ROLE OF MANAGEMENT IN STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT  
 
It would appear that in South Africa the ability of a school to convert resource inputs into educational outputs depends 
on the leadership abilities within the school and the relationship between leadership and test results has been shown 
many times in qualitative studies (eg. Reitzug & Patterson, 1998; Christie, Butler & Potterton, 2007). However, 
Leithwood and Wahlstrom (2008) note that quantitative efforts to establish links between leadership and learning are 
relatively rare and tend to give inconclusive and weak results (Khattri, Ling, & Jha, 2010; Hallinger & Heck, 1996; 
Witziers, Bosker   r ger, 2003;  Louis, Dretzke & Wahlstrom, 2010; Ross & Grey, 2006).  
 
One possible explaination for why there has been such difficulting in establishing the significance of leadership is that 
different schools may have different needs and therefore may be characteristed by their developmental stage, for 
example Marzano and McNulty (2005) state that leadership should be different depending on the developmental stage 
of the school and that it can be engaged in first-order change or second-order (innovative) change, while Day et al. 
(2009) distinguish three broad phases of leadership success: early (foundational), middle (developmental) and later 
(enrichment). A second explaination for the lack of statistically significant evidence is that educational researchers 
hold very different views regarding the ways that school leadership can improve educational outcomes (Wit iers, 
Bosker,    r ger, 2003). This has resulted in multiple models of leadership (Bush (2007) describes 9 such models 
existing in the current literature) resulting in segmented and non-comparable growth in information. Witziers et al. 
(2003) argue that the lack of an integrated theory of school leadership is prohibiting useful research and call for a re-





















Rather than re-conceptualizing school leadership, this paper recommends the use of an existing literature, namely 
Elinor Ostrom’s (1990, 1994, 2005, 2009) Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework for assessing the 
strength of governance in the school setting. This framework is used in part to overcome the disjointed views on 
leadership, however, it is also particularly useful in analyzing a system where the vast majority of schools are 
dysfunctional. The framework has been used successfully and repeatedly in analyzing the strength of a broad variety 
of institutions from common pool resources like forests and irrigation, to local government, day care facilities, and 
micro credit providers (Polski & Ostrom, 1999). The IAD framework will be discussed in the following section. 
 
1.4 LITERATURE SUMMARY 
 
Education has gained increasing international focus in the preceding decades. However a review of the current 
literature has shown that South African schools are largely dysfunctional. They fall far below the international 
benchmark in all tested learning areas (including mathematics, reading and science) and at every testing level. 
Further, within the South African system there is a clearly bimodal pattern in school results and only the richest, 
formerly advantaged, schools are able to achieve good results. While there is an undeniable problem with the 
functionality of schools in the lower quintiles, it does not seem to be driven by insufficient funding. What is more 
likely is that the extensive funds supplied by government have been spent in a manner which does not maximize the 
learning opportuinities of students. A review of the current literature has shown that there are some resources that are 
more likely to increase test scores than others. However, it has also shown that to a large extent the effect of resources 
(especially class size) on test scores is inconclusive. Other inputs, such as the quality of teachers employed and the 
characteristics of the learners’ families have less mixed but still not universally significant effects.  
 
Much of the South African literature indicates that the root cause of the poor quality of education offered in the 
country is largely passive management and the inherited ‘dependency’ culture of poorer schools. However, the 
literature on management as a determinant of school results also gives mixed evidence largely because of the 
problems that arise with ‘measuring’ management. This paper hopes to overcome this complication by proposing a 
new method of benchmarking school leadership.  Chapter 2 introduces the IAD framework and clarifies how it can be 
used to benchmark governance within schools through the development of several ‘governance indices’.  In Chapter 3 
the data set used in this dissertation is discussed. Following this a number of indices are created for the schools within 
the set. These include the governance indices as well as a variety of control indices derived from the literature. 
Finally, a range of statistical methods are employed in order to determine the relative strength of the relationship 




















CHAPTER 2 Modeling School 
Management: A Proposed Approach 
2.1 THE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DESIGN FRAMEWORK  
 
In order to build any kind of model which tests the effect of school management on learner test results it is first 
necessary that there is some meaningful way of benchmarking school management or governance. This paper uses the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework developed by Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom and her 
colleagues (1990; 1994; 2005; 2010).  While the IAD framework was originally designed primarily through studies of 
common pool resources (CPR), this dissertation argues that the school system is an institution which requires similar 
governance structures to more traditional CPRs. The main reason for this is that both face collective action problems 
and, as discussed in the previous analysis of the literature, it appears that many actors in schools, particularly teachers 
and management, choose to override with impunity the formal and informal rules of the game associated with 
collaborative effort. This plays out through absenteeism, poor time management, disproportionate strike action and 
the ensuing lack of disciplinary action taken by those in management positions amongst other things.  
 
Section 2.1.1 explains the fundamentals of the IAD framework, showing how the school is able to fit into the primary 
design. Following this, one aspect of the framework, known as the ‘best practice principles,’ is reviewed as it is from 
these that the main hypothesis of this paper is derived. 
 
2.1.1 The School as an Action Arena with multiple Action Situations:  An 
Introduction To The IAD Framework 
 
Elinor Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development framework is designed around the premise that in order to 
“[understand] a complex whole requires knowledge about specific variables and how their component parts are 
related” (Ostrom, 2009, p. 419). By stripping an institution down to its individual components the framework is able 
to systematically link the social goal being pursued, individual decisions as to whether to cooperate, the quality of 
collective action, and the results achieved. The IAD framework has several conceptual units of analysis (as depicted 
in Figure 4) the most significant unit for policy design being the ‘action arena’. The action arena includes actors 




















arrangement (Ostrom, 2005, p. 14). The outcomes are also affected by contextual factors which encompass the social, 
cultural, institutional and physical environments.  
 
If the school is viewed as an action arena it becomes clear that there are multiple managerial action situations of 
importance. Schools may have different kinds of leadership groups but those that are typically important in South 
African school systems are: the school governing board (SGB), the senior management team (SMT) and phase teams 
(primary schools are divided into foundation (Grade R to 3), intermediate (Grade 4- 6) and senior (Grade 7-9) phases) 
or grade teams. The action situations are comprised of actors, for example, the SMT is often made up of the principal, 
the deputies and the heads of department (HODs). These actors have to interact, for example in the school situation a 
new teacher may have to be hired and the members of the SGB will have interact by interviewing, discussing and 
recommending a candidate for hire. The main goal or outcome of a school is typically to generate good academic 
results and this outcome is affected by the interactions within the action situation. However, the outcome can also be 
affected by contextual factors. While biophysical conditions are not as important a factor in the school arena as they 
would be in a more traditional CPR (such as a fishery) they can still influence school results particularly in rural areas 
(for example children or teachers who walk to school are less likely to arrive at school if it is raining). The attributes 
of the community (as well as the family), such as education and employment levels, have been shown in the literature 
to be particularly influential on learner test results. Finally, the rules in use also influence results. These correspond to 










Figure 4: The IAD Framework 
Source: Adapted from Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994, p. 37) 
 
Figure 5 below introduces a more in depth look at an action situation. Working Components of an action situation 
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specify the nature of the relevant actors as well as the resources and options they face, and thereby serve as a 
generalization of the “rules of a game” (Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994, p. 29). These components include: actors 
in positions who must decide, in line with rational choice theory, among diverse actions in light of the information 
they possess about how the actions are linked to potential outcomes and the costs and benefits assigned to the actions 
and the outcomes. The amount of information that the actors have as well as the control they have over the potential 
outcomes are also influenced by the external variables shown in the previous diagram. One set of these external 












Figure 5: The Working Components of an Action Situation 
Source: Ostrom (2005, p. 33) 
 
To clarify the action situation consider the following example illustrated in parenthesis in Figure 5. One of the actors 
in a school is the principal. The principal may have many roles: he is a member of the SMT, he may also be a teacher 
and he must be a member of the SGB. A particular task (or action) of the members of the SGB (including the 
principal) is the preparation of the budget. If a budgetary decision is being made about whether or not to build a 
library the SGB will have to weigh up the net costs and benefits of such a decision in relation to the potential 
outcomes. There are a number of costs: first there is a clear monetary cost, as well as an opportunity cost, further there 
may be future costs (such as maintenance, purchasing books or the hiring of a librarian) involved. However, the 
library may also be able to increase the test score outcome by providing a place to study after school, improving 
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benefits must be weighed. Additionally, the information about, and control over the decision may be influenced by 
external factors. For example, the school may have been given a grant that must go towards the building of a library 
or there may be some rules in use that influence the decision. Rules in use are a component of the IAD framework 
that is external to the action situation but influences and shapes the outcomes. These rules may be formally written in 
law or may simply be norms that are generally adhered to. The rules correspond to the working components of the 













Figure 6: Rules in Use 
Source: Ostrom (2005, p. 33) 
 
The rules in use as they would appear in the school context are summarized in Table 2 below with examples given 
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Table 2: The Rules in Use within a School 
Rule… Specifies… Example 
Position rules 
 
A set of positions and how 
many participants are to hold 
each position 
 
The SASA (1996) states that there must parent 
members on the SGB and the number must be one 




How participants enter or 
leave these positions 
 
In order to become an educator member of a SGB 
one must first be nominated by the staff and then 
voted in. 
 
Choice (Authority) rules 
 
Which set of actions is 
assigned to which position at 
each node of the decision tree. 
 
The principal cannot hire any staff member directly 
as this action is assigned to the SGB and not 
assigned to the principal’s role. But the principal 
may be involved in the hiring process as an ex-




The transformation function 
from actions to intermediate or 
final outcomes  
 
 
Decision making on the SGB is done through 
discussion and finally voting where all members’ 
votes count equally. 
Scope rules 
 




The SGB is not involved in decisions that affect the 




The information available to 
each position. 
 
If a discussion is taking place on the SGB that is of 
a sensitive nature, (for example a discussion on 
teacher performance) learner members may be 
required to not take part in the meeting as this 




How benefits and costs are 
required, permitted, or 
forbidden to players based on 




SGB members are forbidden to receive monetary 
compensation (a benefit) for their role but they are 
required to attend meetings (a cost) 





















If the school is seen as an action arena it is clear that each ‘action situation’ is subject to different forms of these rules. 
For instance the Department of Education has created, through the 1996 South African Schools Act, a very specific 
position rule for the SGB stating that the members must include: parents, educators, non-educator staff members and 
learners in the 8
th
 Grade or higher and that there must at least one more parent member than staff members, 
3
 but this 
same rule does not apply to the SMT.  
 
This discussion has made it clear that the IAD framework is an appropriate means to structure analysis of the school 
setting. In this paper the ‘best practice principles’ which are drawn from the rules in use are used as a means to 
measure management in the school and these are discussed in the following section.  
 
2.1.2 The Best Practice Principles  
 
At the core of Ostrom’s work are the ‘Design Principles for sustainable management of common pool resources’ also 
known as ‘best practice principles’ (Ostrom, 1990). These principles were distilled from theory and decades of 
empirical studies of community-based CPR situations such as fisheries, forests and grazing land. They capture best 
practices of CPRs that have been used sustainably for decades or even centuries, thus avoiding the famous “tragedy of 
the commons” without relying on privati ation or a “Leviathan” authority. There are eight best practice principles 
and, although not all the principles need to be realized for an institution to be successful, the prospects for sustainable 
governance tend to increase when more of these principles are in place (McGinnis, 2011) Ostrom found that “robust 
systems for governing common pool resources had met most of the good practice principles, and that those systems 
that had collapsed or were performing ineffectively were not so structured” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 259). The best practice 
principles have been used many times and in their analysis of 91 prior studies that evaluated the principles empirically 
Cox et al. (2010) find that the ‘principles are well supported empirically’ (p. 38) when used to assess a diverse group 
of institutions. 
 
There are eight of the principles and they correlate to the rules discussed above. The best practice principles are 
presented in Table 3 in a slightly adapted form that makes them useful for assessing schools.  
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Table 3: The Best Practice Principles 
The Rules Best Practice Principles 
Rules governing eligibility 
 
Boundary rules  
Position rules  
1. Clearly defined participant boundaries 
It is clear who is allowed to be on the SGB/SMT and so on and the roles of these managerial 
bodies are clear and understood by participants and non-participants alike.  
 
Rules governing benefits, costs and decision-making 
Payoff rules  
 
2. Congruence   
Rules specifying the amount that a participant benefits are proportional to the time that the 
participant gives up to fulfill the role. Actors should be satisfied that they are compensated for 
the role they are required to play.  
 
Aggregation rules  
  
3. Collective-Choice Arrangements 
Most individuals affected by the operational rules within the school are authorized to 
participate in making and modifying them. This means that the SGB (which includes staff, 
learners, management and parents) needs to function effectively and that there all members of 
the school frequently discuss school results and policies. 
 
Choice rules  
 
4. Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms 
Rapid, easy-to-use, mechanisms exist for resolving disputes among participants within and 
between actions situations. 
 
5. Graduated Sanctions 
Sanctions for rule violations (such as absenteeism) are applied and these sanctions start very 
low but increase in intensity if a participant repeatedly violates a rule. Additionally, sanctions 
are differentiated across violation type.  
Rules governing monitoring 
 
Information rules  
 
6. Monitoring: 
There is active monitoring of participants and those who monitor the actions of participants are 
accountable to the participants and/or are the participants themselves. This means that those 
who monitor an action situation must be involved in that same action situation as a participant.  
 
Rules governing delegation of decision authority 
Scope rules 
 
7. Minimal Recognition of Rights:  
The rights of participants to self-organize and set rules (or participate in rulemaking) are 
recognized by the South African government. 
8. Nested Initiatives 
There is a polycentric system with multiple nested layers of governance including at least a 
principal, an SMT and an SGB  




















2.2 APPLYING THE IAD FRAMEWORK TO SCHOOLS  
2.2.1 Hypothesis and Caveats Using the Ostrom Principles 
 
The major hypothesis of this paper comes straight from Ostrom’s observation that the stronger the presence of the 
best practice principles, the more likely it is that an institution will experience sustained success. In school situation 
the hypothesis reads that those schools which are able to produce good academic results in adverse situations have 
management systems that subscribe more closely to the best practice principles as outlined by Ostrom than those 
schools in similar situations which produce poor results. 
 
However, with this hypothesis in mind it is important to note that the IAD framework has not been constructed with 
reference to the political context. In the review of the literature it was shown that actors in a school often override the 
rules and that this could occur through ‘predation’ or the use of political channels external to the action situation. 
While the Ostrom principles can prevent free riding, corruption and distribution conflicts, they can only do so much to 
deter predation (such as teachers using unions or ‘contacts’ in the Department of Education to legitimi e 
absenteeism). Ostrom’s work has shown that without the best practice principles in place an institution cannot be 
successful. However, the political context may hinder a schools success even if the principles are in place. Below the 
relationship between the political environment and the Ostrom principles is depicted graphically.  Although the major 
hypothesis holds true, it is important to note that there may be schools which subscribe strongly to the principles but 
remain unsuccessful because of high levels of predation. In this case, where there is both predation and subscription to 
the Ostrom principles, the outcome is ‘uncertain’, however Levy (2011) argues that this outcome will be ‘success’ if 
the school management has its own ‘trumping networks’ that can overcome the threat of predation. A trumping 
network exists if predation can be overcome by influences outside of the action arena. Therefore if a staff member 
predates by being constantly absent but cannot be dismissed due to his or her relationship with a member of the 
Department of Education, only a principal who has equally strong ties to similarly powerful figure outside of the 
school can trump this threat. However, this discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Table 4: Extension of the Hypothesis 
  Is there an environment of predation? 
  Yes No 
 Are the Best 
Practice Principles 
in place? 
Yes Uncertainty Success 




















2.2.2 Index creation  
 
In order to assess the strength of school management this paper proposes that the best practice principles are used as a 
benchmarking system. In order to do this indices must be created for each principle and averaged in order to create an 
overall ‘management index’. First, however, it is important to note that some indices are not of any use for analysis of 
schools which are embedded in the same context. For example, the minimal recognition of right principle states that 
the government must recognize the right of participants to self-organize and this applies linearly to all schools if they 
are taken from the same region and therefore will not be measured. The nested initiatives principle also applies to all 
public schools in South Africa as it is required by law that all schools have a SGB and an SMT.  Furthermore, as is 
the case in projects such as this one, the data dictates the construction of the indices and it is likely that not all the 
indices will be able to be created perfectly or at all. However, bearing in mind that the best practice principles work 
independently of one another the inability to create an index will not influence results. The construction of the various 




















CHAPTER 3 Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 DATA: WCED TESTS AND THE SPADE PROJECT 
 
The majority of the data in this paper comes from the SPADE (Schools Performing Above Demographic 
Expectations) project run by the School of Education at the University of Cape Town. The SPADE project started in 
2011 and in is still in process. The project poses the question ‘what factors can be identified in schools performing 
above expectations given their socio-economic contexts that may contribute to better performance relative to low 
performing schools in similar socio-economic contexts?. The project has acquired a variety of highly detailed data in 
poorer schools through a series of questionnaires, observations and interviews. The schools were selected on the basis 
of their Grade 3 classes’ performances in the Western Cape Education Department (WCED) systemic tests, also 
called the ‘litnum’ tests (as they test literacy and numeracy skills). 
 
The WCED tests are written only in primary schools in the Western Cape as an additional testing mechanism to the 
Annual National Assessments (ANAs), which are written nationwide. The WCED assessments were introduced in 
2002 at the Grade 3 level and 2003 at the Grade 6 level and were conducted on a biennial basis until 2009 where after 
they have been written annually. In 2011 Grade 9 tests were also introduced and all three grades were tested. The 
literacy and numeracy papers have been designed to provide a diagnostic assessment of the provincial education 
system in order to inform future literacy and numeracy strategy, and while teachers do not see the tests (they are 
invigilated by members of the Joint Education Board (JET)), they are given a descriptive analysis of the results so that 
they know where their weaknesses lie (WCED, 2011). What the tests have primarily shown is that the majority of 
learners do not have the required literacy or numeracy skills for their level of education. Table 5 below shows the pass 
rate for Grade 3 learners in the first four systemic tests (a pass for the WCED tests is 50 per cent). Although the 
literacy pass rate has steadily increased, only just over half of Grade 3 learners were able to pass the literacy test in 
2008. The numeracy test pass rate has actually decreased and in 2008 just over a third of learners were passing. Many 
of the questions (especially in the literacy paper) are multiple-choice. 
 
Table 5: Literacy and numeracy pass rates, 2002 - 2008 
Grade 3 2002 2004 2006 2008 
Literacy 35.7% 39.5% 47.7% 53.5% 
Numeracy 37.1% 37.3% 31% 35% 



















3.1.1 Descriptive Overview of the Data 
 
The SPADE project used the results of the WCED literacy and numeracy tests for Grade 3 from 2002 to 2008 (the 
results of four test cycles) to select schools for the sample. This project aims to explore the relationship between 
inputs and educational attainment in poor schools and for this reason schools in the upper two quintiles were not 
considered in the sample selection (this excluded all former white schools). Further, schools with less than 200 
learners where also excluded as a variety of studies have shown that small schools (such as farm schools) are subject 
to different forces. Additionally all schools which included grades beyond Grade 7 (comprehensive and intermediate 
schools) were excluded as these schools employ specialized (subject specific) teachers. In the bottom three quintiles 
schools that had achieved an overall mean for the four-stage period that was at least 5 per cent above the overall mean 
for their former department
4
 were selected.  This resulted in a total selection of nine schools – five former HOR
5
 
schools and four former DET
6
 schools. As such the nine schools represent the full population of large primary schools 
in the lower 3 quintiles achieving above their former-department means in the WCED tests.  
 
Following the initial selection five more schools were selected which matched the demographic profile of the nine 
high achieving schools but whose averages over the same period were a full 5 per cent below the mean of their former 
departments.  Three of these schools were former HOR and the other two were former DET schools.  This was an 
imperative selection mechanism given that this paper intends to test the hypothesis that schools in similar situations 
perform differently based on the functionality of their governance systems. Therefore the selection resulted in a 
demographically similar ‘control group’. The final selection of the schools resulted in five ‘performance bands’: two 
‘high’ performance bands and a corresponding ‘low’ performance band for HOR schools and one ‘high’ and one 
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 The overall mean performance per former department on the WCED math and literacy tests over four cycles are                                                             
= as follows: HOR: 49.9%;  DET: 43.1% 
5
 Former House of Representatives (formerly ‘coloured schools’) 
6




















Table 6: School Performance Bands 
Band Number Mean Score 
Former 
Department 
Number of schools 
in band 
Rank 
1 Above 60% HOR 2 High 
2 55% – 60% HOR 3 High 
3 50% – 55% DET 4 High 
4 45% - 50% HOR 3 Low 
5 35% - 40% DET 2 Low 
 
 
The following table gives a basic overview, including the average test scores, of the schools in terms of the sets of 
high performing school(s) and the demographically similar low performing school. High performing schools are 
given number pseudonyms whereas low performing schools are named with letters. 
 










Matching set 1 HOR 
School 1 3 62.2 1 
School A 3 45.6 4 
Matching set 2 HOR 
School 4 3 61.1 1 
School 5 3 55.1 2 
School C 2 48.4 4 
Matching set 3 
HOR 
 
School 6 2 56.5 2 
School 7 3 56.3 2 
School D 2 49.1 4 
Matching set 4 
DET 
 
School 3 2 52.5 3 
School 2 2 51.1 3 
School B 3 37.2 5 




























 School 9 1 52.5 3 
School E 1 39.3 5 
 
3.1.2 Data Limitations 
 
Unfortunately the nature of the SPADE project and the process of school selection described above have resulted in a 
very limited sample size. With only 14 schools in the data set it is clear that any statistical findings cannot be 
extrapolated to represent the entire population. Further, the size of the sample also poses problems for econometric 
analysis. However, it is also important to note that despite these limitations, the SPADE project was able to acquire 
highly detailed data on family and community characteristics as well as on school resources. Most importantly, the 
data relating to school management is extremely textured which allows for a degree of analysis which has been 
unusual in previous South African data sets. Therefore, despite the limited sample size, the data may still be able to 
uncover nuanced relationships between school governance and test results. In the following section the data for both 
the school level and non-school level variables is discussed and the correlation between these variables and test 
results of each school are examined.  It is also important to be aware that while the correlation coefficients give an 
indication of the magnitude and direction of the relationship between the variables, they do not identify any 
underlying causal  relationship. 
3.2 SCHOOL-LEVEL VARIABLES 
 
The school level data was obtained primarily through discussions with principals and staff members as well as 




Table 8 below gives an overview of the schools’ non-learning and learning resources (including teacher quality) by 
achievement band. There is a remarkable similarity between the resources and the following non-learning resources 
have been excluded from the table as they were present in all schools: a staffroom, an office for the principal, an 
office for admin staff, a computer for the principal, a computer for the admin staff, internet, running water and 
electricity. There were also a number of learning resources that were present in all schools namely: enough desks and 




















excluded from Table 8. The final column of Table 8 presents the mean difference between the high achieving bands 
(1, 2 and 3) and the low achieving bands (4 and 5) and indicates whether this difference is significant.  
 
The only physical learning resource that differs between schools is the presence of a school library. Looking at the 
data it is clear that top performing schools are more likely to have a library than their below average preforming 
counterparts and all but one top performing school has a library but only one low performing school does. In many 
schools there may be a library present but without a designated teacher to open and monitor the use of the space (a 
‘librarian’) the resource may be under-utilized. Six out of the nine top performing schools have both a library and a 
librarian and, markedly, none of the five below average schools do. Class size, which was recurrent in the literature, 
seems to be very similar across the sample with the performance bands’ averages lying between 32 and 37 pupils. It 
does seem as if higher performing schools may have slightly smaller classes, especially in the HOR categories where 
the two higher performing bands have an average of between 32 and 33 learners but the low performing band has an 
average of over 37 learners per class.  The mean difference in class size between high and low achieving schools is 
statistically significant at the 10 per cent level.  
 
Teacher quality is not directly observable and in this paper teacher education level and teaching experience is used as 
a proxy. The schools each had between two and five Grade 3 teachers and as such the total years of teaching 
experience for Grade 3 teachers was averaged for each school. Qualifications were rated according to the teachers 
Relative Education Qualification Value (REQV) and the number of teachers with a REQV of 13 or lower (without an 
appropriate degree or ‘under-qualified’ by South African standards) were averaged for each school and then again for 
each band. Former-HOR school teachers in the sample tend to be more experienced, with all bands having an average 
teaching experience of more than 20 years. All schools had at least one teacher with an REQV less than 14, however, 
former-DET schools, on average, had less under-qualified teachers. Teachers in the high performing schools in this 

























Table 8: Mean School Resources by Performance Band 
School Resources School Performance Band n=14 
  1 2 3 4 5 Mean Diff. 
(high – low) 
LEARNING RESOURCES       
Library 1.00  (0.00) 0.67  (0.58) 1.00  (0.00) 0.33  (0.58) 0.00  (0.00) 0.725** 
Library with librarian 0.50  (0.71) 0.67  (0.58) 0.75  (0.50) 0.00  (0.00) 0.00  (0.00) 0.64*** 













Learning Resource Index (  )  6.67 8.81 7.18 3.03 3.19  
TEACHER QUALITY 
     
 
Average experience (years) 25.83 (3.06) 22.00 (3.12) 13.28 (4.77) 24.88 (3.08) 18.17 (2.59) -1.16 
Average with REQV less than 
14 
1.5 (0.71) 1.67 (1.61) 1.25 (0.50) 1.33 (0.58) 1 (0.00) 0.308 
Teacher Quality Index (  ) 6.27 3,47 3,13 7,16 6,95  
Resource Index     6.47 6.14 5.16 5.09 5.07  
Department Averages 6.30 5.16 5.09 5.07  
Overall Performance Average 5.73 5.08  
Standard deviations in parenthesis  
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level  
 
For ease of comparison all mean resource scores in Table 8 were indexed to lie between 0 and 10
7
. The averages of 
these normalized variables are given in order to create a learning resources index     , a teaching quality index (    
and an overall resources index (R). The high performance bands achieve an average overall resource index score of 
5.73 while the low performance bands’ score is only incrementally lower at 5.08. The Spearman correlation 
coefficients are between the   ,    and R scores and test scores for each band and then for each school are given in 
Table 9. The learning resource index is quite highly correlated to test results and stands at over 0.6484 (significant at 
the 5 per cent level) when determined using individual school results. Teaching resources are negatively correlated to 
test results when determined by band and only show a small positive correlation when determined by school. 
However, neither of these results is significant, even at the 10 per cent level. The overall resource index is not 
significantly correlated to school results by band. However, the coefficient between test results by school and the 
                                                     
7
 When the variable has previously been shown to be positively associated with results (like more years of teaching experience) 
the formula                         was used where S represents the set of band averages. When the variable was 
negatively associated with learning (such as larger class sizes) the formula                         was used. In this way 




















overall resources index is very large at 0.7538 and is significant at the 5 per cent level. Therefore, this data set 
reasserts that school learning resources are linked to school performance.   
 
Table 9: Spearman Correlation Coefficients Between Test Scores and Resource Indices 
 Observations Learning Resources (    Teaching Resources (    Resources     
By Band 5 0.6000 -0.5000 0.6000 
By School  14 0.6484**  0.0198  0.7538** 
* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level  
  
 
3.2.2 School Governance 
3.2.2.1 INDEX CREATION 
 
Using the data from a number of surveys and from researcher observation, a number of management indices have 
been created. The indices created come from the best practice principles as outlined in Chapter 2. In some cases, 
namely the nested initiatives and minimal recognition of rights principles, it was not necessary to create an index as 
the result would have been the same for all schools. This is because these principles are influenced by the government 
structures surrounding the schools and, because all the schools are in the Western Cape, this structure is the same for 
all schools. In one case, namely the conflict resolution principle, there simply was not enough data to create an index. 
This is unfortunate, but as is the nature of such a project, not wholly unexpected. In some cases it was not possible to 
get data on each action situation. However, it is most likely that if the principle is in place at the most basic level 
(treating the entire school as an action situation) then it will be in place throughout the smaller action situations. The 
indices created are for: the boundary principle, the collective action principle, the congruence principle, the 
monitoring principle and a form of the graduated sanctions principle (just called the sanctions principle as it was 
unable to capture the degree of graduation). The construction of the utilized variables is reviewed below. 
 
3.2.2.1.1 BOUNDARY PRINCIPLE 
 
The boundary principal captures the degree to which the various roles of managerial positions in the school are 



















data came from two separate interviews. The first interview was with the principal of the school and the second 
interview came from another school leader (usually an HOD). The two people surveyed where both asked to explain: 
 ‘What are the main roles and tasks of [five different management positions]?’
8
 
If both of the interviewees were able to clearly explain the roles and tasks of a position as outlined by the Department 
of Education
9
 a value of 1 was given but if only one or neither of the interviewees could accurately describe the 
position a value of 0 was given. Therefore if the principal was able to describe the role of the SGB (being a 
participant) but the HOD (as a non-participant) could not then the score for this position registered a zero. These 
dummy variables where then added meaning that a maximum score of 5 could be obtained.  
 
3.2.2.1.2 CONGRUENCE PRINCIPLE 
 
The congruence principle requires that the amount a participant benefits is proportional to the amount of time that that 
participant gives up to fulfill that role. The data used to create this index came from three different questions. First, if 
the costs and benefits are proportional in a school then it is expected that staff members will be more satisfied in their 
jobs and so the school leader interviewed was asked: 
 ‘How satisfied are teachers in their jobs at this school?’ 
 To respond, the interviewee could select one of three options: very satisfied, quite satisfied or not satisfied. If the 
response was ‘not satisfied’ a score of  ero was g ven and if the response was ‘very’ or ‘quite satisfied’ a score of one 
was given.   
 
Secondly, the degree to which the school attempts to relieve extra stress that its teachers may face was evaluated and 
the question asked was: 
‘Does the school have a policy on inducting new/newly-qualified teachers into the school?” 
If the respondent (in this case the principal) responded in the affirmative and was able to explain the system (usually 
one of mentoring) then a score of one was give, if not the score was zero. 
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 The positions which they had to explain were the principal, an HOD, the SMT, the SGB and the phase or grade team 
9
 For example it was necessary that their description of the role of the SGB had to include a mention of ‘governance’ as this is the official role 




















The third component included in this index is whether the school has more than one admin staff member as a frequent 
complaint of teachers (especially HODs and other managerial staff) is that admin (unrelated to teaching and learning) 
consumes too much of their time. Once again the score given was either a one or a zero meaning that a school could 
achieve a maximum score of 3. 
 
3.2.2.1.3 MONITORING PRINCIPLE 
 
The monitoring principle requires that there be active monitoring of the participants. Further it requires that the 
person doing the monitoring is a participant and in this way if someone is monitoring the staff that person should also 
be a staff member and not someone from outside the school action situation. For the creation of the index three 
components of monitoring have been included. The first is general time management (outside of the classroom) as if 
participants are closely monitored it would follow that they will follow the school’s schedule. Four components were 
included in this subsection, two of which came from observation by the researcher and two that came from the 
interview with the principal. If the school day was observed to start on time on the days that the researchers were in 
the school a score of one was given, if it started late the score given was zero. Secondly, the researchers observed the 
staff sign in register and if it was up to date and functional a one was given. It was the case that all schools in the 
sample had up to date registers and so this measure was not used. From the principal questionnaire the two questions 
of importance were: 
“Do staff and learners return to class on time after breaks?” 
“Is each year plan checked by a senior teacher/HOD?”  
All the schools in the set had teachers whose year plans are checked and so this measured was dropped. If the 
principal affirmed that participants returned to class on time a score of one was given. 
 
The second form of monitoring that is included in the index is administrative monitoring. This included two observed 
measures: first the researcher observed whether teaching and learning materials are monitored through an up to date 
LTSM. Second the researcher observed whether there was a central record of student results signed by the principal as 
this indicates that the principal is aware of and monitors learners progress. A score of one was given for each of these 
measures. 
 
The final part of the monitoring index is the monitoring of teaching and learning. Two components were included 
here, first was the frequency of classroom observation based on the following two principal survey questions: 
“Are any classroom observations undertaken by the SMT/HOD?” 



















The principal could respond with one of the following three options: ‘almost never’, ‘occasionally’ or  ‘regularly’. If 
the response was ‘regularly’ for either of the two questions a score of one was given as it indicates that there is 
frequent classroom observation by management. The second component of this part of the index came from the 
following question in the principal questionnaire:  
“Are any inspections of learner books or assessment tasks undertaken by the SMT/HOD/principal?” 
Once again if the principal answered ‘regularly’ a score of one was given, otherwise  ero. All components considered 
a school could score a maximum of six for this index. 
3.2.2.1.4 SANCTIONS PRINCIPLE 
 
The graduated sanctions principle requires that there are sanctions for rule violations but that they start very low and 
increase in intensity. In this way if a pupil is late for school once a low sanction would be applied (perhaps a ‘black 
dot’) but if the pupil is continuously late this punishment would be increased (perhaps to detention). The data for this 
index came from the following questions:  
“Are learners disciplined when they break the school’s code of conduct?” 
“Are teachers disciplined when they break the school’s professional standards of staff?” 
 The answer to this question could either be ‘No, almost never’, ‘Sometimes, it depends’ or ‘Yes, definitely’. A score 
of  ero was given for each of these questions if the answer was ‘no, almost never’ and one otherwise. Further, if the 
answer was ‘yes, definitely’ for both questions an additional point was given. The total available for this index was 
therefore three. Unfortunately there was not enough data available to capture the degree of sanction.  
graduation’, only the willingness to sanction when a rule violation occurs. Therefore this index has been named the 
‘sanction index’   
 
3.2.2.1.5 COLLECTIVE CHOICE PRINCIPLE  
 
The collective choice principal requires that all parties affected by organizational rules in the school (for example the 
starting time of the school day) be allowed to participate in making and modifying them. This index is made up of 
four components which speak to the degree of involvement of different parties within the school. The most obvious 
collective action group within the school is the SGB. The following question assessed the degree of success that 
parents and teachers experience in discussing and changing the operational rules in the school: 




















If the answer to this question was ‘not effective’ a  ero was given, but if the answer was ‘it works very well in our 
school’ or ‘it functions reasonable well’ a score of one was given.  
The second component assesses the degree to which all parents are able to be involved in and made aware of the 
functioning of the school. The question of importance from the survey with the principal is: 
 “How often does the school hold parent meetings?”  
If the answer indicated that the school held meetings once a term or less a zero was given. Schools, which had more 
frequent meetings, were awarded a one. The next component measured how often staff consult one another on learner 
results as this indicates the degree to which teaching staff involves on another on decision making. The question here 
is:  
“How often is learner performance discussed in this school?” 
 If discussion is infrequent or is done only in meetings every term the school received a zero for this measure. If 
however discussion happens at least weekly and in an informal manner as well as in meetings the school received a 
one.  
The final component included was whether leadership was rated as democratic (as opposed to laissez-faire or 
authoritarian) as this shows how the staff as a whole is involved in the decision-making. The survey here asked for the 
participant to check which of the following statements best-described leadership in their school: 
 “School leaders give orders and supervise work closely” 
 “School leaders involve staff in decision making and trust that when staff members are given a task they will do a 
good job” 
 “School leaders give little input and let staff members work out their problems on their own” 
If the second statement (which indicates a democratic relationship) was chosen the school was given a one. If the first 
or last statement was chosen then the school received a zero. Therefore a maximum score for the collective choice 
index is four. 
 
3.2.2.2 BAND MANAGEMENT INDEX SCORES 
 
The indices all have been normalized
10
 to a maximum of 10 and a minimum of zero. Table 10 below shows the mean 
indices scored by performance band. These scores have been formulated by normalizing the mean band index scores. 
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It is clear that those bands which perform above average comply more strongly to the measured best practice 
principles than those who perform less well. There is a clear dissimilarity between the scores of the top three bands 
and the bottom two bands of all the principles.  The fact that the average of the top two schools (performance band 1) 
achieve the highest rating in all the measured principles and lowest performance band perform the worst in all but one 
category is particularly pertinent.   In none of the indices do the two below average bands have scores higher than the 
three above average bands. The scores are frequently arranged from highest to lowest in accordance with the bands 
and this pattern is repeated when the indices are averaged to give a total management score (‘M’). The management 
score (M) is clearly associated with performance and there is a substantial difference between the score of the 3
rd
 band 
(7.02) and the 4
th
 band (2.90). This ‘drop off point’ is not observable in the resources index. When comparing across 
department the DET schools upper band performs at a close to a factor of ten higher than the lower band (HOR upper 
band scores are close to three times as high as the lower band). Further, when averaging in terms of high and low 
performance the high performing schools achieve an average management score of 8.07 which is more than four 
times higher than the low performing bands’ average of 1.89. However, it is important to note that the governance 
indices may be correlated to unobservables and therefore be over-inflated. For example, it may be the case that there 
is better monitoring in a school because the parent body is more involved and pressurizes the principal to monitor his 
teachers’ classes. Therefore the monitoring score may be high due to the effect of the parent body rather than the 
strength of the school managerial body.  
 
Table 10: Mean School Governance Indices by Performance Band 
School Governance 
Principles 
School Performance Band 
n=14 
 
1 2 3 4 5 Mean Diff. 
(high – low) 
Boundary (    10.00 (0.00) 10.00 (1.73) 9.06 (1.26) 0.00 (0.58) 4.38 (2.12) 7.5**  
Congruence      10.00 (0.71) 4.44 (1.53) 6.67 (0.82) 2.22 (0.58) 0.00 (0.00) 5.93* 
Monitoring     10.00 (0.85) 8.97 (1.00) 7.05 (1.26) 4.70 (2.08) 0.00 (2.12) 6.32* 
Collective Action     10.00 (0.00) 4.67 (0.58) 4.00 (1.00) 2.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.71) 5.22* 
Sanctions     10.00 (1.41) 7.78 (1.00) 8.33 (0.50) 5.56 (0.58) 0.00 (1.41) 5.92* 
Management Index     10.00 7.17 7.02 2.90 0.88  
Department Averages 8.59 7.02 2.90 0.88  
Overall Performance Average 8.07 1.89  
Note: Standard deviations for non-normalized scores given in parenthesis 
*significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level  





















The management scores (M)
11
 for each school are depicted in Figure 7 below. Higher management scores  tend to be 
associated with higher test results, even when they are not averaged by performance band. While the trend is not 
exactly linear, the association between management and test scores is quite remarkable, especially when comparing 
across departments. All but one high achieving school attain management scores above the average while all low 
preforming school score below the average. School 6 appears to be an outlier as it obtains a management score of 
only 3.50 which is significantly lower than would be expected given its average test score of 56.5 per cent. School 6’s 
score is similar to or lower than the low performing former HOR schools A, C and D and is the only high performing 
school that falls below the overall management score mean of 5.8. While School E obtains a score of 5.17 which is 
higher than expected considering it is the school with the lowest test results, it does not appear to be an outlier as it’s 
score is not higher than any of the high performing former DET schools. School 6 causes some problems for the 
premise than schools need good management scores in order to achieve above demographic expectations and thus is 
discussed in more detail below.   
 
Figure 7: Management Scores by School 
 
Source: SPADE and author’s own calculations 
                                                     
11








































Average Test Score 

























3.2.2.3 OUTLIER DISCUSSION 
 
One possible reason that School 6 is an outlier could be that it is embedded in a very different community or have 
learners and parents with different attributes to the rest of the schools in the sample. It could be the case that the 
learners at the school achieve higher test results because of higher levels of parent involvement or ability. In larger 
samples this endogeniety problem could become a serious econometric problem.  Table 11 below shows Schools 6’s 
scores for all the measured indices as well as the ranking (out of the 14 schools) for these scores. In terms of family 
characteristics, School 6 scores lower than expected given that the school obtains the third highest score and low 
levels of employment and parent education means the school ranks second to last in terms of general family 
characteristics. The community around the school also scores lower than expected and the school experiences 
problems with drug and alcohol abuse, low levels of literacy and vandalism interfering with teaching and learning. 
Overall the community index is ranked 11
th
 out of the 14 schools. School resources, on the other hand, are ranked 
highly. The school is one of the smaller ones in the sample, equipped with a library and a librarian although average 
class size stands at 37 and is one of the larger, despite this the school ranks first in learning resources. Although 
School 6 is only ranked 9
th
 in the teacher quality index, overall it is ranked first in the resource index.  While the 
school may be better resourced than some, it does not seem to be embedded in a superior community than the other 
schools in the sample. In fact the family and community attributes are ranked very low considering the schools good 
results.  
 
Table 11: School 6 Indices and Rankings
12
 
Index Index Score Index Rank 
General Family      3.56 13 
Family Literacy (    4.11 7 
Family Involvement (  ) 4.28 9 
Family Index ( ) 4.00 9 
General Community (    5.27 9 
Community Problems (  ) 3.30 12 
Community Index ( ) 4.18 11 
Learning Resources (    8.15 1 
Teacher Quality (  ) 7.68 9 
School Resources Index ( ) 8.00 1 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on SPADE (2012) 
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Another reason that this outlier exists could be due to managerial change (the hiring of a new principal) since the 
capturing of the results (which happened between 2002 and 2008) and the capturing of the management indices 
(which happened in 2012). If this were the case one would hypothesize that more recent test results would be lower 
than the average from 2002 to 2008. Six of the 14 schools have hired a new principal since 2008. Four of these new 
principals have only been at the school for a matter of months (less than one year) and are unlikely to have changed 
the managerial paradigm in such a short time, however there are two schools that hired new principals 4 years ago and 
School 6 is one of these schools and the low preforming School A is the other.  
 
In order to test the hypothesis that this managerial change may have influenced the school test results the most recent 
(2011) results are displayed in Table 12 below. There has been a large decrease in School 6’s test scores and in 2011 
the school achieved an average (numeracy and literacy) Grade 3 score of 43.6 per cent. Some of this decrease can be 
attributed to the raising of the WCED test standards. However, the school also fell in ranking from third to sixth- this 
means that it is now the lowest scoring ‘above average’ former HOR school and is outperformed by one above 
average former DET school. While there have been some changes in the ranking of the schools’ test results, a fall of 
three positions is the largest downward shift. This change is remarkable considering the new principal has only been 
in place for four years, and, while the school is still ranked in the top half of the sample, it may be the case that this 
downward trajectory will continue into the future.  
 
Table 12: Schools 6 WCED Results 
 Percent Rank 
WCED Average (2002-2008) 56.5 3 
WCED 2011 43.6 6 
Source: WCED 
 
Further information arose during the week of research in School 6 as it appeared as if one of the Grade 3 teachers had 
links to the department of education. It became evident that this teacher was able to acquire ‘litnum tests to practice 
with’ from a member of the department although this is not standard procedure. The teacher was therefore able to 
teach to the test which resulted in her class achieving an incredibly high average of over 80 per cent in the 2011 
litnum test while the other Grade 3 teacher’s class fared much worse achieving an average of 16 per cent in the same 
test. It would appear as if this school is subject to a form of predation which actually inflates results in addition to the 



















appears to be an outlier in terms of its management score, and also accounts for more than 7 per cent of the sample, 
the following statistical analysis also offers results generated with a restricted sample that omits School 6. 
 
3.2.2.4 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MANAGEMENT INDICES 
3.2.2.4.1 SPEARMAN CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS  
 
In Table 13 below the Spearman correlation coefficients between the management indices and tests scores by band, 
by school and by the restricted sample of schools are displayed.  It is clear that the management index (M) is highly 
and significantly correlated with test scores. By band the index is perfectly correlated but even when allowing for a 
greater degree of variability the correlation coefficient remains large. Without dropping the outlier the correlation 
coefficient is 0.7187, significant at the 5 per cent level. However, when School 6 is dropped from the sample the 
coefficient increases to 0.8791 and is significant at the 1 per cent level.  
 
Table 13: Spearman Correlation Coefficients Between Test Scores and Management Indices 
 
*significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level  
 
Many of the component management indices are also significant and all of them, except sanctions are fairly large in 
magnitude. In the restricted sample all except sanctions obtain sizeable and significant coefficients of over 0.5. The 
collective action index is significant at the 1 per cent level in all cases and has the largest coefficient of all the 
component indices. The congruence and monitoring indices are also significant at at least the 10 per cent level in all 
cases.  Once again, it is important to note that these correlation coefficients could be over inflated as they may include 
the input of, for example, well-managed schools being imbedded in more engaged communities with parents who 
value education highly. 
 
 Observations Boundary 
Index (    
Congruence 
Index      
Monitoring 
Index      
Collective 
Action Index 
     
Sanctions 
Index      
Management 
    
By Band 5 0.8721* 0.9000** 1.0000*** 1.0000*** 0.9000** 1.0000*** 
By School  14 0.4357 0.4556* 0.6153** 0.7566*** 0.2981 0.7187** 
By School 
(excl. School 6) 




















3.2.2.4.2 GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION  
 
A graphical representation of the relationship between each schools management index and test score is shown in 
Figure 8 below. There is a clear upward trend and those schools which are below average (scoring less than 50 per 
cent) achieve lower management scores. Figure 9 illustrates the relationships between each of the component 
management indices and test results for each school and shows that in all cases there is a positive relationship. In no 
instance does a low performing school achieve an index score of 10 and close to 25 per cent of all below average 
school scores are zero. Therefore, the graphical representation of the management indices confirms the hypothesized 
relationship between management and test scores in disadvantaged South African schools. 
 
 




















































Figure 9: Relationship between component management indices and test scores 
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3.2.2.4.3 T-TESTS OF MEAN DIFFERENCES 
 
Below the results of a t-test to test whether the difference in management index means between high achieving bands 
(or schools) and low achieving bands (or schools) are given. Once again the restricted sample omits the outlying 
school, School 6.  
 
Table 14: t-Test of mean differences for the Management index 
Test Description Band School (Full Sample) School (Restricted Sample) 
Observations: High Achieving 3 9 8 
Observations: Low Achieving 2 5 5 
Null Hypothesis      Difference in mean management indices < 0 
t-statistic -4.23 -3.52 -4.55 
Prob. that means are the same (Pr(T < t)) 0.012 0.0021 0.0004 
Outcome Reject  Reject Reject 
 
In all cases the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the mean management scores in the high 
performing and low performing schools is rejected. When the bands are tests the t-statistic is -4.23 and the null 
hypothesis is rejected at the 5 per cent level. In the cases where the restricted and non-restricted school samples are 
tested the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 per cent level in both cases. The results indicate that there is a significant 
difference in the management scores of high achieving as opposed to low achieving, schools. Following this the 
restricted sample was used to determine whether the mean component management indices           differed 
between high and low achieving schools. The results are given in Table 15. 
 
Table 15: t-test of Mean Differences for the Component Management Indices 
Test Description  Boundary Congruence Monitoring Collective 
Action 
Sanctions 
t-statistic -3.66 -2.95 -2.40 -2.68 -1.79 
Prob. that means are the 
same (Pr(T < t)) 
0.0019 0.0067 0.0178 0.0108 0.0509 



















The results show that the null hypothesis of zero difference can be rejected for all component management indices.
13
 
The t-tests show that high and low achieving schools in the sample have statistically significantly different scores for 
not only the management index, but also for all the component indices.  
 
The statistical analysis in this section unearthed several facts. First, it is clear that the sample contains one outlier due 
to the break between the collection of test score and management data. This school also experienced high levels of 
predation. It is clear that the outlying school should be excluded from the analysis as the small sample size means that 
one outlier can cause large discrepancies in results. The analysis was therefore run with both a restricted and a non-
restricted sample. The results indicate that the management index as well as all its component indices are highly 
correlated with test results result and the Spearman coefficients were significant by band as well as by school. In the 
restricted sample 4 out of the 5 component indices were highly correlated with test results. Further, a graphical 
analysis of the data showed that there is a clearly positive relationship between all the management indices and 
results. Finally, a series of t-tests revealed that the mean management index scores for the high and low achieving 
schools are statistically different by school and by band even when the outlier was included. This result also held true 
for all of the component indices and it is clear that school management plays a large role in acquiring higher test 
results.  
 
3.3 NON SCHOOL-LEVEL VARIABLES 
 
These variables were obtained through learner and parent questionnaires: information was obtained from a total of 
1244 learners and 1054 parents across the 14 schools. 
 
3.3.1 Family Characteristics 
 
These variables have been sub-divided into three categories that speak to different aspects of the family. The first are 
general characteristics of the learners and their parents (or ‘caregivers’ as some children do not live with their 
parents). South African legislation states that children may enter school (Grade 1) at the age of 5 provided he or she 
turns 6 by the 30
th
 of June that year. If a learner’s parents feel that he or she is not ready for school then it is also 
permissible for a child to enter grade one at the age of 6 turning 7. Therefore by Grade 3 children should be between 
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 When this same t-test was run with both bands and the unrestricted sample results were broadly similar with the null hypothesis being 




















the ages of 7 (ages were recorded in May and April) and 9. Children aged 10 and older are ‘too old’ for their classes 
and are probably repeaters which should negatively affect test scores. There are a number of older children in all the 
bands and in the third band (the top preforming DET band) an average of as high as 26 per cent of learners are older 
than 10 years. Most households speak English at least some of the time, irrespective of their band or their former 
department
14
. Bearing in mind that all tests in Grade 3 are written in the learner’s home language, it is less likely that 
the frequency of speaking English at this stage would be related to test results and the mean difference is not 
statistically significant. Employment and education levels are higher in the parent bodies of better performing schools. 
Main caregiver employment in above average schools is over 60 per cent in all the performance bands (and close to 
70 per cent in the top two bands) whereas in the lowest preforming schools this figure is below 50 per cent. The mean 
difference in employment between the above average and below average bands is statistically significant at the 5 per 
cent level. While the majority of parents do not have a matric, parents of learners in the top performing schools are 
more likely to have completed school. Additionally, parents of learners in former DET schools are less likely to have 
a matric or higher education and in the fifth performance band less than a third of parents have completed school. A 
large number of learners reported that they do not live with both their parents and this is largely correspondent with 
school performance band. There is, however, not a huge degree of variation here with the average percent of learners 
who live with only one or none of their parents falling between 50 and 65 per cent. Once again these variables have 
been normalized and averaged to create a general family index      and this is distributed sequentially with the 
highest preforming schools achieving the highest score (8.59) and lowest performing band achieving the lowest score 
(2.21) 
 
The second category is ‘literacy’ and this contains data on the basic literacy practices of both the parents and the child 
including ownership of books, reading and library membership. Less than half the learners belong to a non-school 
library and there are very few library members in the fifth band. The higher the performance band, the more likely it 
seems to be that a learner will own at least one book as over a third of learners in the lower bands own no storybooks. 
Learners from the top band own the most books with an average of close to seven books per learner. This pattern of 
ownership is mimicked by the parent reports of the overall number of books in the household with more families 
having at least 10 books in the upper bands than the lower. Very few families reported having more than 20 books 
across all performance bands with 11 per cent in the top band being the highest. Households in lower performing 
schools also have less literate adults living in them, either because of high levels of adult illiteracy or because 
households have more child residents. Most learners are read to at least once a month by their parents in all the 
performance bands. The index for the family literacy variable      is once again higher in the better performing 
bands, however the top score for this index is actually in band 2 and not band 1 but the lowest score is in the bottom 
band. 
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 Former department largely determines the language of the school with former DET schools teaching predominantly in Xhosa in the Western 



















Table 16: Mean Family Characteristics by Performance Band 
Family Characteristics School Achievement Band 
n=14 
  1 2 3 4 5 Mean Diff. 
(high–low) 
GENERAL 
     
 
Learners 10 and older  0.13 (0.06) 0.8 (0.05) 0.26 (0.12) 0.13 (0.11) 0.10 (0.03) 0.04 
HH that never speak English  0.12 (0.01) 0.19 (0.08) 0.13 (0.04) 0.19 (0.07) 0.17 (0.00) -0.03 
Learners live with both parents 0.65 (0.12) 0.58 (0.12) 0.59 (0.04) 0.60 (0.02) 0.50 (0.03) 0.06 
Caregivers employed 0.68 (0.12) 0.67 (0.19) 0.64 (0.05) 0.56 (0.19) 0.49 (0.06) 0.14** 
Caregivers with matric or higher 0.42 (0.07) 0.52 (0.28) 0.36 (0.01) 0.34 (0.01) 0.28 (0.07) 0.13 
General Family Index      8.59 6.96 5.01 4.07 2.21  
LITERACY 
     
 
Number of learner books  6.81 (0.5) 6.73 (2.67) 4.22 (1.83) 3.86 (1.61) 3.68 (0.09) 2.15 
Learners with no books 0.15 (0.09) 0.21 (0.18) 0.29 (0.13) 0.33 (0.11) 0.35 (0.02) -0.12* 
Learners’ non-school library members  0.47 (0.29) 0.55 (0.28) 0.43 (0.17) 0.40 (0.35) 0.26 (0.07) 0.15 
> 10 books in the house 0.38 (0.13) 0.49 (0.11) 0.21 (0.03) 0.33 (0.19) 0.20 (0.09) 0.10 
> 20 books in the house 0.11 (0.04) 0.10 (0.02) 0.06 (0.03) 0.06 (0.07) 0.03 (0.01) 0.05* 
Literate adults as per cent of total hh 0.61 (0.15) 0.52 (0.01) 0.44 (0.07) 0.48 (0.03) 0.48 (0.01) 0.05 
Learners read to less once a month 0.12 (0.05) 0.08 (0.03) 0.06 (0.05) 0.17 (0.04) 0.13 (0.01) -0.07* 
Family Literacy Index      8.39 8.55 3.60 2.40 0.84  
PARENT INVOLVEMENT 
     
 
Caregiver has met teacher 0.93 (0.03) 0.93 (0.03) 0.86 (0.08) 0.88 (0.03) 0.85 (0.08) 0.04 
Caregiver not visited school this year 0.06 (0.03) 0.04 (0.02) 0.07 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) 0.08 (0.02) -0.00 
Caregiver aware of week’s material 0.57 (0.05) 0.56 (0.11) 0.47 (0.07) 0.43 (0.10) 0.37 (0.07) 0.13* 
Good parent meeting attendance 0.50 0.33 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.44*** 
Clear parent support at school 0.50 0.33 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.36** 
Family Involvement Index       8.85 8.35 4.37 3.28 0.00  
Family Index     8.59 8.02 4.24 3.15 0.99  
Department Index Average 8.31 4.24 3.15 0.99  
Performance Band Index Average 6.95 2.07  
Standard deviations in parentheses 





















The third group of variables in Table 16 reflects ‘parent involvement’ in teaching and learning. This includes 
involvement with the school and with the child’s learning.  The majority of parents have met their child’s teacher and 
very few have not been to the school with very little variation. There is a more distinguishable difference between 
parents knowledge of what their child is learning in the upper and lower performance bands. Approximately 20 per 
cent more parents are aware of what book their child is reading and what concepts they are covering in math in the 
first performance band compared to the fifth. The data also makes it clear that parents in high performing schools are 
more supportive of their children’s’ school. At least half the parent body attends meetings in some (but not all) of the 
high performing schools, but in no low preforming school is this true. Additionally, more principals reported that their 
school’s parent bodies support teaching and learning in the school in high performance schools- although many stated 
that parents want to support the school but are ill-equipped to do so. The family involvement index      is strongly 
associated with performance with the lowest band registering a zero in all the index components. 
 
An overall ‘family index’     was constructed by averaging all the normalized components in Table 16. This index is, 
as expected given previous findings, including the Coleman Report (1966) strongly associated with performance and 
distributed according to performance bands. The top band scored as high as 8.59 while the bottom band scored a 
remarkably low 0.99. However, despite the fact that the top three bands scored higher than the bottom two in all the 
indices, the difference between the third and the forth band is not substantial and there does not seem to be the same 
‘drop off point’ that was evident in the management indices.  
 
The Spearman correlation coefficients between family indices and school results (by band and by school) are given 
below. All the coefficients are significant at either the 5 or 1 per cent level. The general family index      has the 
smallest coefficient by school while the family literacy      has the biggest at 0.7055. The overall family index (F) is 
significant at the 1 per cent level by band and by school and achieves a coefficient of 0.7714 by school which is larger 
than the coefficient found for resources and management using the same sample (but smaller than the coefficient for 
management using the restricted sample). It is clear that the sample schools’ ability to generate academic results is 
influenced by their learners and parents characteristics, and this is in accordance with the previous literature. The 
smaller magnitude of    coefficient could be related to the fact that the selection process matched high and low 
performing schools in terms of their demographics meaning that the general characteristics of families (many of 
which, such as education, are related to wealth) would be similar across schools. The   and    indices are generally 
not related to wealth (although there is an argument that wealthier families own more books it is more likely that 
families who value education will own books independent of wealth) and so there is more variation across the bands 

























* significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level  
 
3.3.2 Community Characteristics 
 
The general community characteristics measured were household size, number of parents who had lived in the 
community for 6 or more years (well established households), and SES. SES was measured through two means, first 
learners were asked to circle all the objects that they had at their house out of a list of the following ten items: radio, 
tv, newspaper, fridge, microwave, inside toilet, hot water, washing machine, car and computer. The second measure 
was houses that were not made out of brick or concrete as reported by parents. Household sizes are quite large on 
average with all performance bands having house sizes in excess of 5.50 people and the bottom band having the 
largest households of 6.33 on average. In general, learners at former DET schools have a lower SES than those at 
former HOR schools. There is no clear distinction in SES between the upper and lower former DET bands and the 
quality of housing data indicates that the learners in lower performing DET schools may actually have a higher SES.  
Because of the selection of ‘matching’ schools, it is not the case that learners in the top bands come from families 
with much higher SES than learners in the bottom bands 
 
Most of the schools in the sample experience problems with community that interfere with teaching and learning in 
the school. Close to 100 per cent of the schools reported problems with low levels of parent literacy and high levels of 
drug and alcohol abuse. Other issues are less widespread and violence and problems with gangs seems to be more 
prevalent in former HOR school areas while some schools in all the performance bands experience vandalism 
problems, often committed by learners. Another facet that has been included here is the number of parents that 
reported having no involvement in the community (this means that they are not part of any community organization, 
sports club or church). Parents in former DET schools tend to be much more involved in the community than those in 
former HOR schools. The community problems index is seemingly uncorrelated with results with the index score 
being very low in the two top preforming bands and the highest score being found in the bottom band. Overall the 
community index is very similar across the high performing and low performing bands with the second band 
obtaining the lowest score due to the levels of violence, low literacy and alcohol abuse. Overall there is less than a 1.5 
point difference between above average and below average community index scores, and the below average schools 
score higher. Additionally, in only one instance is the mean difference between the high achieving bands and low 




Index (    
Family Literacy 
Index      
Family Involvement 
Index     
Family Index 
    
By Band 5 1.0000*** 0.9000** 1.0000*** 1.0000*** 




















Table 18: Mean Community Characteristics by Performance Band 
Community Characteristics School Performance Band n=14 




     
 
Average household size  5.69 (0.59) 5.86 (1.09) 5.48 (0.35) 5.69 (0.52) 6.33 (0.19) -0.33 
Per cent of established HH  0.76 (0.07) 0.80 (0.06) 0.70 (0.12) 0.81 (0.11) 0.78 (0.04) -0.04 
Per cent with brick houses 0.75 (0.03) 0.81 (0.05) 0.45 (0.19) 0.68 (0.11) 0.71 (0.22) -0.03 
SES proxy (out of 10) 8,29 (0.16) 7,98 (1.05) 6,23(0.63) 7,20 (0.64) 6,86 (0.49) 0.47 
General Community Index (    
   
 
7,85 8,36 2,50 7,18 4,36  
PROBLEMS       
Parents not involved community  0.15 (0.11) 0.17 (0.02) 0.02(0.01) 0.20 (0.01) 0.03 (0.02) 0.00 
Violence/Gangs 0.50 0.67 0.25 0.67 0.50 -0.11 
Drugs/Alcohol 1 1 1 0.67 0.50 0.42*** 
Low Literacy 1 1 1 0.67 1 0.17 
Vandalism 0.50 1 0.50 0.33 0.50 0.25 
Community Problem Index      
 
2.83 0.32 5.50 5.33 6.25  
Community Index     
 
5.06 3.90 4.17 6.16 5.41  
Department Index Average 4.48 4.17 6.16 5.41  
Performance Index Average 4.37 5.78  
Standard deviations in parentheses  
*significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level  
 
 
The Spearman correlation coefficients are given once again, this time between the community indices and test scores 
by band and by school. Counter-intuitively, the community problem index appears to be negatively correlated to 
school results (those schools which experience greater problems with the community actually do better than those 
with less problems). The distinctly different communities surrounding former-HOR as opposed to former-DET 
schools could explain this. Therefore, although the former HOR form the higher bands (bands 1, 2 and 4 as opposed 
DET band 3 and 5) they tend to have parents who are less involved in the community and have a higher prevalence of 





















Table 19: Spearman correlation coefficients between community indices and test scores 
 
*significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level  
 
3.4 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 
In Table 20 below the previously discussed Spearman correlation coefficients are given by band and by school for the 
four major indices.  
 
Table 20: Summary of Spearman Correlation Coefficients 
 By Band By School 




Family 1.0000*** 0.7714*** 
Community -0.6000 0.0769 
significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level  
 
 
The findings broadly reassert many of the findings found in a review of the previous literature: school resources used 
for learning are highly correlated with test outcomes. Interestingly, this dissertation did not find a significant 
correlation between teaching resources and school results, but this may be because the proxy used for teacher quality 
was insufficient and a more nuanced approached needs to be undertaken. A second finding was that family plays an 
important roll in school test results: the general characteristics of the family (including employment and education) 
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 This result was gained using the restricted sample. Using the unrestricted sample gave a coefficient of 0.7187, significant at the 5 per cent 
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Community Problems 
Index      
Community Index     
By Band 5 0.6000 -0.8000 -0.6000 




















and the involvement of the family in schooling (including visits to the school and awareness of learning material) are 
both significant in generating test results. However, the strongest relationship can be found between the family 
literacy index and test results and it appears as if the number of books that learners and their parents own or have 
access to is highly correlated to test results. The community characteristics on the other hand (including SES, a 
particularly well reviewed variable in the literature) do not seem to be highly or significantly correlated to test results. 
This may be due to the process of school selection as high achieving schools were ‘matched’ to low performing 
schools embedded in similar communities. Most interestingly given the hypothesis of this dissertation, the highest 
correlation was found between school management and school results. It appears as if school results are not 
independent of management and that management may be the most important factor in determining results in this 
sample. 
 
To test this theory further the following education production function model was run using ordinary least squares 
(model 1): 
                               
Where the dependent variable ‘Results’ is the vector of 2011 litnum results by school
16
, F is the family index, M is the 
management index, C is the community index and R is the resource index for each school and   is the error term. 
Before the results are presented it is essential to note that there is a significant caveat to this regression. The sample is 
problematic due to its small size (14 schools in total). There ore, while the results reported hold true for this sample, it 
is important to not give them too much weight, as it is unlikely that they can be extrapolated to represent the entire 
population of schools in South Africa. In order to gain a more valid result one would need to significantly increase the 
sample size.  
 
The OLS results are presented in Table 21. In brief the results from model 1 show that the management index and the 
resources index are the only indices that have a significant effect on test results in the sample. Family is jointly 
significant with the management index at the 1 per cent level and it appears they are quite highly correlated with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.802 significant at the 1 per cent level. It may be the case that good school management 
promotes literacy interests in learners and parents and encourages parents’ interest in their children’s learning.  When 
the same regression is run without the management index (model 2), the family index is positive, large and significant 
at the 5 per cent level. In the primary model, management is significant at the 5 per cent level and has a coefficient of 
2.254, therefore if a school were to increase its overall management index by 5 points the school’s WCED test results 
would increase by over 11 per cent. The resource index has an even larger coefficient, although it is only significant at 
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 The 2011 results are used as in this way there is no discrepancy between the test results and the management scores and therefore School 6 



















the 10 per cent level. While the results are limited and can not go very far in disentangling underlying relationships, it 
is clear that management is a very important input into the education production function in the sample of schools 
used in this paper. 
 











Standard errors in parenthesis 











Dependent Variable: 2011 WCED Grade 3 test results  
    (1)   (2) 




Management Index     2.254** 
(0.799) 
- 












Observations (n) 14 14 




















CHAPTER 4 Conclusion 
 
4.1 OVERVIEW OF THE PAPER 
 
A review of the literature in Chapter 1 made it clear that while much research has been done on the determinants of 
learner results, the findings on the effect of school management are often inadequate as the measurement of this 
component is largely inconsistent and subjectively determined. This dissertation hopes to overcome the problems 
associated with measuring school management through using a previous literature on governance as a base to build a 
benchmarking system for schools. For this reason, the Institutional Analysis and Design framework, developed by 
Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues (1990, 1994, 2005, 2010) over the course of the last 30 years, is central to this 
paper. The framework is described at length in Chapter 2, and the best practice principles, which are core to the IAD 
framework, formed the basis of this paper’s hypothesis: 
Schools which are able to produce good academic results in adverse situations have management systems that 
subscribe more closely to the best practice principles as outlined by Ostrom than those schools in similar situations 
which produce poor results. 
In order to test this hypothesis, management indices were built for a sample of 14 public schools in the Western Cape. 
A total of five component management indices and one aggregate index were built for each school using the highly 
detailed data provided by the UCT SPADE project. In addition to the management indices a number of control indices 
were build for components that have previously been found to influence learner test scores. This included several 
family variables, community variables and measures of school resources. Following the construction of the indices, a 
number of statistical tests were run in order to determine the validity of the hypothesis. 
 
4.2 SYNTHESIS OF RESULTS 
 
Spearman correlation coefficients were estimated for each index and the relevant school test results. It was found that 
school management has the largest and most significant coefficient and that many of the component management 
indices were also significant. The coefficient on the management index was a full 10 per cent higher than the 
coefficient on the family index implying that management is more highly correlated to learner results. This result is 
interesting considering that family background effects are most frequently cited as being the most important 



















than any other variable in the determining of learner test results. This result was reasserted by two other means. First, 
graphical representations of the management indices showed that there was a clear positive relationship between 
management and test scores in the sample. Secondly, t-tests of mean differences showed clearly that, on average, high 
performing schools achieve higher management scores than low performing schools, significant at the 1 per cent 
level. Additionally, further t-tests illustrated that this same trend held true for each of the component indices.  It 
appears that those schools that achieve results above demographic expectations have management systems that 
subscribe more closely to the Ostrom best practice principles than those schools that do not perform as well in the 
same context. 
 
Although the sample size is problematic, OLS estimates showed that the coefficient of the management index was 
significant and large indicating that management is an important determinant of school test results in the sample. The 
OLS estimates also showed that the family index is influenced by the management index indicating that good school 
management promotes literacy habits and involvement in learning by parents.   
 
All finding from this paper have shown that management is a crucially important determinant of learner test results in 
the Western Cape. 
 
4.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
There was a clear limitation to this study in that the sample size was too small to be representative of the full 
population of schools in the Western Cape. This was due to the selection technique used by the SPADE project. 
However, while the sample size did limit econometric analysis, the data collected by SPADE is of a very detailed 
nature. It was this level of detail that allowed for the creation of the management indices and certainly the results do 
indicate that there is an interesting relationship between management (as measured by the best practice principles) and 
learner results within the sample. In order to determine whether this relationship is casual and holds at the population 
level it is necessary for the sample size to be increased while using the same management measurement techniques 
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Appendix Table 1: Family Indices by School 
School Pseudonym 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E 
Test Score 62.20 51.10 52.50 61.10 55.10 56.50 56.30 53.30 51.80 45.60 39.30 48.40 49.10 37.20 
GENERAL               
Older than 10 8.08 6.76 0.72 5.72 7.79 7.47 9.97 5.37 0.00 6.94 8.60 3.90 10.00 7.23 
HH that never speak 
English (%) 
8.74 7.62 8.83 9.02 5.10 4.84 9.41 6.97 9.88 10.00 7.01 9.50 0.00 6.87 
Learners live with both 
parents (%) 
10.00 5.84 2.41 3.62 0.00 3.07 9.10 4.66 4.01 5.27 1.94 4.90 3.91 0.14 
Caregivers employed 
(%) 
3.96 3.66 5.20 7.82 5.61 1.47 10.00 6.10 5.47 2.00 0.60 8.02 0.00 2.62 
Caregivers with matric 
or higher (%) 
2.32 1.29 1.28 4.05 3.53 0.94 10.00 2.94 3.65 1.94 0.00 1.94 1.80 1.73 
Average (    6.62 5.03 3.69 6.05 4.41 3.56 9.70 5.21 4.60 5.23 3.63 5.65 3.14 3.72 
LITERACY 
             
 
Average number of 
learner-owned books 
6.43 1.20 5.92 5.45 4.65 2.86 10.00 2.22 0.06 1.22 1.50 4.33 0.00 1.69 
Learners with no books 
(%) 





















library members (%) 
2.13 0.84 5.19 8.22 10.00 1.89 6.96 5.91 6.12 2.26 1.39 9.84 0.00 2.75 
More than 10 books in 
the house 
3.19 2.19 1.73 6.88 6.54 5.49 10.00 1.54 0.71 2.16 0.00 8.31 1.15 2.65 
More than 20 books in 
the house 
6.01 7.29 4.05 10.00 6.62 7.01 8.83 2.39 4.20 3.28 2.02 9.71 0.00 1.62 
% of literate adults in 
house 
3.72 0.86 0.00 10.00 4.47 3.72 4.52 1.61 4.94 2.50 3.12 3.79 2.42 2.62 
Learners read to less 
once a month (%) 
2.99 7.60 6.07 6.50 7.64 6.81 5.24 5.24 10.00 3.93 4.16 2.21 0.00 3.70 
Average      4.38 2.94 4.55 8.11 6.93 4.11 7.94 3.41 4.07 2.77 2.06 6.24 0.51 2.59 
INVOLVEMENT 
             
 
Caregiver has met 
teacher (%) 
8.94 5.90 7.73 7.31 10.00 8.44 6.91 0.00 6.74 6.64 7.59 4.71 7.19 2.24 
Caregiver not visited 
school this year (%) 
7.68 5.84 6.01 3.30 10.00 6.11 5.30 0.00 3.91 9.05 4.50 4.60 9.19 2.00 
Caregiver aware of 
week’s material (%) 
6.10 6.53 4.18 8.06 3.70 6.88 10.00 1.73 4.39 3.35 2.97 0.06 5.84 0.00 
Schools with good 
meeting attendance 
10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 
Clear parent support at 
school 
10.00 0.00 10.00 0.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Average       8.55 5.65 7.58 5.74 6.74 4.28 6.44 2.35 5.01 3.81 3.01 1.87 4.44 2.85 





















Appendix Table  2: Resource Indices by School 
School Pseudonym 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E 
Test Score 62.20 51.10 52.50 61.10 55.10 56.50 56.30 53.30 51.80 45.60 39.30 48.40 49.10 37.20 
LEARNING               
Library 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 0.00 
Library and Librarian 0.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Class size 7.50 4.57 6.85 4.57 4.57 3.26 10.00 3.70 4.73 2.93 6.09 6.74 0.00 3.26 
School size 1.68 2.13 0.00 0.88 5.80 9.35 9.43 5.23 4.77 3.31 5.01 8.72 10.00 8.07 
Average      4.79 4.17 6.71 6.36 7.59 8.15 4.86 7.23 7.37 1.56 2.77 3.87 5.00 2.83 
TEACHING               
Average years 
experience 
7.89 4.27 1.89 10.00 8.29 5.37 7.56 5.12 0.00 8.44 4.31 6.99 10.00 6.10 
REQV less than 13 10.00 10.00 10.00 5.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 5.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 5.00 10.00 
Average      8.94 7.13 5.95 7.50 4.15 7.68 8.78 7.56 2.50 9.22 7.15 8.50 7.50 8.05 





















§Appendix Table  3: Management Indices by School 
School Pseudonym 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E 
Test Score 62.20 51.10 52.50 61.10 55.10 56.50 56.30 53.30 51.80 45.60 39.30 48.40 49.10 37.20 
PRINCIPLE               
Boundary 7.50 10.00 7.50 7.50 10.00 2.50 10.00 2.50 7.50 0.00 0.00 2.50 0.00 7.50 
Congruence 10.00 6.67 6.67 6.67 10.00 0.00 6.67 10.00 3.33 6.67 3.33 3.33 3.33 3.33 
Monitoring 8.00 6.67 5.00 10.00 10.00 8.33 6.67 6.67 10.00 1.67 0.00 8.33 6.67 5.00 
Collective Action 10.00 0.00 6.67 10.00 6.67 3.33 6.67 6.67 6.67 3.33 0.00 3.33 3.33 3.33 
Sanctions 10.00 6.67 3.33 3.33 10.00 3.33 6.67 6.67 6.67 3.33 0.00 6.67 3.33 6.67 



























Appendix Table  4: Community Indices by School 
School Pseudonym 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E 
Test Score 62.20 51.10 52.50 61.10 55.10 56.50 56.30 53.30 51.80 45.60 39.30 48.40 49.10 37.20 
GENERAL               
Average household 
size  
4.88 6.13 6.83 8.97 8.21 0.00 10.00 9.42 9.34 8.16 4.44 8.59 3.99 3.15 
Percent of established 
HH  
7.24 8.14 0.00 4.59 8.56 7.61 5.38 4.96 3.48 4.02 5.60 10.00 8.09 7.25 
Percent with brick 
houses 
8.66 5.57 0.00 7.97 9.18 8.50 9.82 6.21 4.21 8.94 5.53 7.31 5.76 10.00 
SES proxy (out of 10) 7.24 1.10 3.50 7.86 5.19 4.98 10.00 3.27 0.00 5.31 2.73 5.88 2.64 4.62 
Average      7.00 5.23 2.58 7.35 7.79 5.27 8.80 5.96 4.26 6.61 4.58 7.95 5.12 6.26 
PROBLEMS               
Percent of parents not 
involved community  
0.00 9.62 8.97 7.03 2.08 3.51 2.38 9.88 9.74 1.94 10.00 0.68 1.38 8.67 
Violence/Gangs 0.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 10.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 0.00 10.00 
Drugs/Alcohol 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 
Low Literacy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 
Vandalism 0.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 




















Overall Average (C) 3.50 3.58 4.19 6.38 4.10 3.99 4.64 5.97 4.10 3.50 4.29 8.04 3.70 6.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
